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Executive Summary  
Government attacks on the judiciary and political dissent have accelerated Sri Lanka’s 
authoritarian turn and threaten long-term stability and peace. The government’s 
politically motivated impeachment of the chief justice reveals both its intolerance 
of dissent and the weakness of the political opposition. By incapacitating the last 
institutional check on the executive, the government has crossed a threshold into 
new and dangerous terrain, threatening prospects for the eventual peaceful transfer 
of power through free and fair elections. Strong international action should begin 
with Sri Lanka’s immediate referral to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group 
(CMAG) and a new resolution from the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) calling for 
concrete, time-bound actions to restore the rule of law, investigate rights abuses and 
alleged war crimes by government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), and devolve power to Tamil and Muslim areas of the north and east. 
Sri Lanka is faced with two worsening and inter-connected governance crises. The 
dismantling of the independent judiciary and other democratic checks on the execu-
tive and military will inevitably feed the growing ethnic tension resulting from the 
absence of power sharing and the denial of minority rights. Both crises have deep-
ened with the Rajapaksa government’s refusal to comply with the HRC’s March 2012 
resolution on reconciliation and accountability. While the government claims to 
have implemented many of the recommendations of its Lessons Learnt and Recon-
ciliation Commission (LLRC) – a key demand of the HRC’s resolution – there has in 
fact been no meaningful progress on the most critical issues: 
 the government has conducted no credible investigations into allegations of war 
crimes, disappearances or other serious human rights violations; 
 rather than establish independent institutions for oversight and investigation, the 
government has in effect removed the last remnants of judicial independence 
through the impeachment of the chief justice; 
 there has been no progress toward a lasting and fair constitutional settlement of 
the ethnic conflict through devolution of power; 
 the military still controls virtually all aspects of life in the north, intimidating and 
sidelining the civilian administration; 
 more than 90,000 people remain displaced in the north and east, amid contin-
ued land seizures by the military, with no effective right of appeal and no fair 
process for handling land disputes; 
 government security forces have broken up peaceful Tamil protests in the north, 
detained students on questionable charges of working with the LTTE and actively 
harassed Tamil politicians; 
 the government has responded with force to protest and dissent in the south, too, 
deploying troops to prevent the newly impeached chief justice and supporters 
from visiting the Supreme Court while pro-government groups attacked lawyers 
protesting the impeachment. 
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Analysts and government critics have warned of Sri Lanka’s growing authoritarian-
ism since the final years of the civil war, but developments over the last year have 
worsened the situation. The president’s willingness and ability to push through the 
impeachment – in the face of contrary court rulings, unprecedented opposition from 
civil society and serious international concern – confirms his commanding political 
position. The move completes the “constitutional coup” initiated in September 2010 
by the eighteenth amendment, which removed presidential term limits and the in-
dependence of government oversight bodies. It has sent a clear message to domestic 
critics that their dissent is unwelcome.  
The consolidation of power paves the way for moves that could further set back 
chances of sustainable peace. The president and his two most powerful brothers – 
Defence Secretary Gotabaya and Economic Development Minister Basil – have sig-
nalled their intention to weaken or repeal the provinces’ already minimal powers. As 
the government makes explicit its hostility to meaningful power sharing between the 
centre and the Tamil-speaking north and east, Tamil identity and political power are 
being systematically undermined by the military-led political and economic trans-
formation of the northern province.  
Recent months have also seen an upsurge in attacks by militant Buddhists on 
Muslim religious sites and businesses. The government has done little to discourage 
these. Should such provocations continue, the remarkable moderation of Sri Lanka’s 
Muslims could face serious tests. Given the country’s history of violent resistance to 
state power perceived as unjust, the authoritarian drift can only increase the risk of 
an eventual outbreak of political violence.  
Sri Lankans of all ethnicities who have struggled to preserve their democracy de-
serve stronger international support. The HRC’s 2012 resolution was an important 
first step, but more is needed. This should begin with a stronger HRC resolution in 
March 2013, which must demand concrete reforms to end impunity and restore the 
rule of law; mandate the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
to monitor violations and investigate the many credible allegations of war crimes 
committed in the final months of the war by both sides; and, where possible, identify 
individuals most responsible.  
The Commonwealth secretary general should formally refer Sri Lanka to the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), which should insist that the gov-
ernment take substantial steps to restore the independence of the judiciary. Were it 
to refuse, the Commonwealth should relocate its November 2013 heads of govern-
ment meeting, currently scheduled to take place in Colombo, or at the very least par-
ticipants should downgrade their representation. 
All governments and multilateral institutions with active ties to Sri Lanka must 
rethink their approach and review their programs in light of Colombo’s deepening 
and dangerous authoritarian drift. This includes military-to-military relations and 
bilateral and multilateral development assistance, including from the UN, World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
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Recommendations  
To the government of Sri Lanka:  
1. Comply with current and future HRC resolutions, including by implementing the 
core recommendations of the LLRC on governance, the rule of law, accountability, 
devolution of power and reconciliation, through a process that includes opposi-
tion political parties and independent civil society representatives of all ethnic 
communities.  
2. Support meaningful reconciliation by publishing the full LLRC report in Sinhala 
and Tamil, allowing the national anthem to be sung in Tamil at official events and 
holding public ceremonies to honour the death and suffering of civilians from all 
communities. 
To the UN Human Rights Council (HRC): 
3. Adopt a new, stronger resolution on Sri Lanka at its 22nd session, which: 
a) notes clearly the government’s refusal to respect the previous resolution by 
failing to implement the most important LLRC recommendations and refusing 
to investigate credibly allegations of grave violations of international humani-
tarian law; 
b) details specific measures the government must take within the coming year;  
c) requests the government to investigate independently the credible allegations 
of international humanitarian law violations; 
d) tasks OHCHR with monitoring and reporting to the council on progress in im-
plementing the resolution and on any violations, and with undertaking inves-
tigations and making appropriate recommendations with respect to violations 
allegedly committed in the final months of the war, including by compiling a 
list of individuals about whom there is credible evidence.  
e) encourages the government to invite those special rapporteurs with outstand-
ing requests to visit Sri Lanka, and requests them to compile a joint report on 
the country’s compliance with its international obligations. 
To the Commonwealth Secretariat and member states: 
4. Refer Sri Lanka to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), which 
should insist that the government take substantial steps to restore the independ-
ence of the judiciary, including, at a minimum, by: 
a) reestablishing earlier constitutional provisions – abolished by the eighteenth 
amendment – to ensure a less politicised selection of judges;  
b) changing current parliamentary provisions for removing senior judges to 
bring them in line with international standards; and  
c) abandoning government plans to limit a chief justice’s term to three years. 
5. Relocate, should the government fail to make these changes, the November 2013 
heads of government meeting away from Colombo, or downgrade representation 
to ministerial level. 
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To the UN Secretary-General: 
6. Use his powers under section 99 of the UN Charter to establish a commission of 
inquiry into alleged violations of international law, should the HRC decline to do 
so or to task OHCHR to undertake investigations. 
7. Establish a mechanism to “monitor and assess the extent to which the Govern-
ment of Sri Lanka is carrying out an effective domestic accountability process”. 
To the UN Secretariat, country team and agencies in Sri Lanka: 
8. Undertake a “human rights audit”, led by the country team, of all programming 
to examine where and how these can better integrate human rights protection, 
including a survey of the protection needs of past and present humanitarian 
workers, both in and out of Sri Lanka. 
9. Review Sri Lanka’s contributions to peacekeeping operations and reject its par-
ticipation until credible investigations of war crimes allegations and prosecutions 
are carried out. 
To the governments of India, the U.S., EU, UK, Canada, Australia, 
Norway, Switzerland, Japan and South Africa: 
10. Investigate, gather and share evidence regarding alleged war crimes and human 
rights abuses by government forces and the LTTE where possible, support vic-
tims and offer witness protection when necessary. 
11. Refrain from accepting the diplomatic credentials of Sri Lankan military officers 
against whom there are credible allegations of serious crimes; cease trainings 
– other than in human rights – and joint exercises with the military; and apply 
targeted pressure on government leaders, including restrictions on personal 
travel until the government complies with HRC resolutions. 
To the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and International 
Monetary Fund: 
12. Review all programs in Sri Lanka and conduct a study of governance and land 
issues and how these affect the sustainability and equity of their development 
assistance. 
13. Press strongly, both privately and publicly, for the government to adopt the LLRC’s 
recommendations, particularly on reestablishing judicial independence and an 
independent bribery commission, enacting a freedom of information law, pro-
tecting the rights of citizens to speak freely and contribute to the formulation of 
development policies, and reforming policies on land and land disputes. 
Colombo/Brussels, 20 February 2013
International Crisis Group 
Asia Report N°243 20 February 2013  
Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn:  
The Need for International Action 
I. Introduction 
Sri Lanka’s 26 years of war between government forces and ethnic Tamil separatists, 
led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), came to a cataclysmic end in 
May 2009, with some 40,000 civilians likely killed in the final five months.1 Despite 
shocking levels of violence, many in Sri Lanka and among the country’s international 
partners hoped that the defeat of the LTTE, itself a ruthless, ultra-violent organisa-
tion, would lead to new, more conciliatory and democratic policies. The government 
was called to shrink the size and role of the military, relax the grip of its security ap-
paratus, and begin to repair the damage caused to its democratic institutions, par-
ticularly the police and judiciary, by almost 30 years of war and emergency. Many 
hoped that the government would end institutionalised impunity for human rights 
violations and open up political space for dissent, adopting a more consensual style 
of governance. 
Expectations also ran high, particularly from India and the U.S., that the gov-
ernment, led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, would offer a meaningful package of 
constitutional reforms, including substantial devolution of power to the northern 
and eastern provinces, in order to address the longstanding political marginalisation 
of Tamils. In other ways, too, supporters of the government encouraged it to lay the 
groundwork for reconciliation and the rebuilding of trust between Sri Lanka’s three 
major ethnic communities: Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. As part of this, there 
were calls for the government to investigate the allegations of serious violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law by both sides in the final stages of 
the war and to establish at least some degree of accountability. 
Unfortunately, these hopes and expectations have not been met. By early 2012, 
international disappointment at the Sri Lankan government’s failure to adopt con-
structive post-war policies reached the tipping point. At the March 2012 session of 
the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), a U.S.-sponsored resolution on “promoting 
reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka” was adopted with a clear majority of 
states, including Sri Lanka’s powerful next-door neighbour, India.2 The resolution 
 
 
1 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°191, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, 17 May 2010. For other Crisis 
Group reporting useful in understanding recent authoritarian moves, see, in particular, Asia Re-
ports N°239, Sri Lanka: Tamil Politics and the Quest for a Political Solution, 20 November 2012; 
N°219, Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Minority Rights, 16 March 2012; N°220, Sri Lanka’s 
North II: Rebuilding under the Military, 16 March 2012; N°217, Sri Lanka: Women’s Insecurity in 
the North and East, 20 December 2011; N°209, Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever, 21 
July 2011; N°206, India and Sri Lanka after the LTTE, 23 June 2011; N°159, Sri Lanka’s Eastern 
Province: Land, Development, Conflict, 15 October 2008; N°141, Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism 
and the Elusive Southern Consensus, 7 November 2007; N°124, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, 
14 June 2007. 
2 Resolution 19/2 was passed on 22 March by a vote of 24 to fifteen, with eight abstentions. The text 
is available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/19/2. 
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called on Sri Lanka to adopt the recommendations of President Rajapaksa’s own 
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC),3 appointed in 2010 as a re-
sponse to growing international pressure on the need for accountability for alleged 
violations of international law in the final months of the war. The HRC’s resolution 
noted with concern that the LLRC report did not adequately address these allega-
tions and called on the government to remedy this. 
This report, based on interviews with diplomats, aid workers, journalists, and com-
munity and civil society activists, analyses the policies pursued by the Sri Lankan 
government since the HRC resolution. It examines in detail the government’s national 
action plan to implement the LLRC’s recommendations,4 comparing it with the rec-
ommendations of the LLRC, the requirements of the HRC resolution and the reality 
of government policy. It looks at the government’s increasingly overt turn to authori-
tarian rule, characterised by the undermining of judicial independence and an ever-
greater concentration of power in the executive and military, and the risks this raises 
for lasting peace and democratic stability. Finally, the report considers the challeng-
es these developments pose for the international community and the need for influ-
ential states and multilateral organisations to re-shape their policies significantly. 
 
 
3 The LLRC was appointed by President Rajapaksa on 15 May 2010, and delivered its report to the 
president on 15 November 2011. The report was released to the public on 16 December of that year. 
The full text can be found at http://slembassyusa.org/downloads/LLRC-REPORT.pdf. 
4 The text of the National Plan of Action to Implement the Recommendations of the LLRC was re-
leased on 26 July 2012. The full text can be found at www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ 
ca201207/20120726national_plan_action.htm. 
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II. HRC and LLRC Implementation: A Failure to Deliver 
The March 2012 HRC resolution on “promoting reconciliation and accountability 
in Sri Lanka” was a modest but important step, which, had it been respected, would 
have tangibly improved the protection of rights and quality of governance for Sri 
Lankans. Unfortunately, the government has failed to follow through in any mean-
ingful way on any of the nine areas of reform the resolution specified, choosing in-
stead to push through policies that have further weakened democracy and in effect 
dismantled the rule of law. 
The HRC resolution requested the government to implement the “constructive 
recommendations” of its own Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission 
(LLRC), specifying the need to:  
Credibly investigate widespread allegations of extrajudicial killings and enforced 
disappearances, demilitarize the north of Sri Lanka, implement impartial land 
dispute resolution mechanisms, re-evaluate detention policies, strengthen for-
merly independent civil institutions, reach a political settlement on the devolution 
of power to the provinces, promote and protect the right of freedom of expression 
for all and enact rule of law reforms. 
The HRC also requested the government to present “a comprehensive action plan” 
for achieving these goals as well as “to address alleged violations of international 
law”, which the HRC noted had not been “adequately addressed” by the LLRC.5 
The government’s July 2012 national action plan for the implementation of the 
LLRC was far from an adequate response to the council’s resolution.6 It committed 
the government to a much smaller set of actions than those recommended by the 
commission, which were themselves significantly less far-reaching than what is pro-
posed in the April 2011 report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Account-
ability in Sri Lanka.7 The action plan ignored or rejected most of the LLRC’s key pro-
 
 
5 The HRC resolution also encouraged the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) and relevant special procedures mandate holders to offer advice and technical assistance 
to the Sri Lankan government to implement the resolution, and requested OHCHR to report back 
to the council on the provision of this assistance. While the government did not allow any of the 
special mandate holders with outstanding visit requests to travel to Sri Lanka, a team from OHCHR 
did visit in September 2012. The high commissioner’s report to the council, released in February 
2013, found that “the Government has made commitments to only some of the [LLRC’s] recom-
mendations”, and that “the steps taken by the Government to investigate allegations of human 
rights [violations] further have also been inconclusive, and lack the independent and impartiality 
required to inspire confidence”. “Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on advice and technical assistance for the Government of Sri Lanka on promoting 
reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka”, A/HRC/22/38, 11 February 2013. 
6 The government has established a committee of senior bureaucrats, headed by the president’s sec-
retary, Lalith Weeratunga, to oversee the implementation of the action plan. For there to be any 
chance of implementing the core LLRC recommendations on governance, what is needed instead is 
an independent commission, staffed by prominent members of civil society representing all major 
communities and regions, to be given adequate resources and public powers to oversee and monitor 
their implementation. 
7 “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka”, 31 March 
2011, available at http://bit.ly/hpta0k. For Crisis Group’s analysis of the limitations of the LLRC 
report, see “Statement on the Report of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commis-
sion”, 22 December 2011.The LLRC was initially established in an attempt to prevent the Secretary-
General from appointing his advisory panel on accountability, the so-called panel of experts. In the 
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posals on governance and impunity for human rights violations and watered down 
even its weak recommendations to investigate a small number of alleged war crimes. 
More than six months after its publication, the promises of the action plan remain 
largely unfulfilled, while the political situation has deteriorated significantly, most 
notably with the politically motivated impeachment of the chief justice.8 
In what follows, the LLRC’s chief recommendations in each of the areas of con-
cern cited by the HRC resolution will be compared with the government’s action plan 
and with actual government policy and actions since the LLRC report’s publication.  
A. The Rule of Law  
1. LLRC and government action plan 
The central value of the LLRC report lay in its repeated if generally implicit criticism 
of the extreme centralisation of power in the executive and military. Even before the 
impeachment of the chief justice, the Rajapaksa administration had in effect dis-
mantled existing checks on presidential and military power. This included bringing 
the attorney general directly under the president’s office and the police under the de-
fence ministry and, most important, amending the constitution to give the president 
effective control over judicial appointments and over formerly independent commis-
sions on police, human rights, public service, judicial services, and other issues.9 The 
LLRC argued that the current governance system is broken and that new, independ-
ent, institutions and procedures are needed to reestablish the rule of law and protect 
rights.10  
The government’s LLRC action plan rejected this central message and insisted 
that any improvements in human rights protection could be done within existing in-
stitutions and procedures. In response to the LLRC’s recommendation to establish 
“an independent permanent Police Commission without delay” (para. 8.210)”,11 the 
action plan simply claimed that an “Independent Police Commission has already 
been established”. The independence of the commission was, however, explicitly re-
 
 
following months, the government relied upon the LLRC and its forthcoming report to argue that 
no international action on accountability and rights violations was needed.  
8 The government has nonetheless claimed repeatedly that it has “implemented a major portion of 
the recommendations in the LLRC report already”. “‘See progress’, our defence in Geneva”, Daily 
News, 31 January 2013. As evidence of implementing the LLRC, government spokespersons often 
point to the government’s large-scale demining, successful resettlement of more than 400,000 
internally displaced persons and rebuilding of infrastructure in the north. All of these had been 
achieved prior to the LLRC issuing its report, however, and none touches on the heart of the com-
mission’s recommendations, which concern the quality of governance. 
9 The eighteenth amendment was ratified in September 2010. In addition to reasserting direct pres-
idential control over various oversight commissions, it also removed presidential term limits. For 
an analysis of the eighteenth amendment, see Crisis Group Podcast, “Sri Lanka: Deciphering the 
constitutional coup”, http://bit.ly/XnTXmR, 4 October 2010. 
10 In a section entitled “Failure to give effect to the rule of law”, the LLRC writes, “Many persons 
who made representations before the Commission stated that a large number of persons having po-
litical patronage had committed offences, but the long arm of the law had not reached them because 
of the political pressure exerted on law enforcement authorities. Along with an independent Judici-
ary and a transparent legal process a strict adherence to the Rule of Law is a sine qua non for peace 
and stability which is of the essence, if there is to be any meaningful reconciliation” (para. 8.185). 
11 The LLRC envisions a commission “empowered to monitor the performance of the Police Service 
and ensure that all Police officers act independently and maintain a high degree of professional 
conduct” (par 8.914). 
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moved in September 2010 by the eighteenth amendment, which gave the president 
the power to appoint all its members and removed many of its previous functions. 
The action plan sidestepped the equally important recommendation (para. 9.214-5), 
that the police service once again be made independent of the defence ministry 
(headed by the president’s brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa), choosing instead to pass 
this issue on to a proposed parliamentary select committee (PSC) that may never be 
constituted.12 
Far from initiating the “credible and independent actions” called for by the HRC, 
the action plan refused to establish a single independent process or institution able 
to place any checks on executive or military power, and assumed that the police and 
the military can credibly investigate crimes even when they or other agents of the 
state are accused of being involved.  
2. Impeachment of the chief justice 
The already slim chances of reestablishing independent institutions and strengthen-
ing the rule of law were delivered a fatal blow with the government’s November 2012 
decision to seek the impeachment of Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake, which 
was finalised with her removal from office on 13 January 2013. Rather than follow-
ing the LLRC’s advice and restoring the independence of the judiciary and of the com-
missions nullified by the eighteenth amendment, the government chose to impeach 
the chief justice and concentrate power even further. 
Appointed by President Rajapaksa less than two years earlier, Bandaranayake 
appears to have angered the president and his powerful brothers with a number of 
Supreme Court rulings. Particularly important was the 17 September 2012 decision 
temporarily blocking a law to establish a new department of “Divineguma” (“Uplift-
ing Lives”) that would consolidate a range of government welfare and development 
programs under the economic development ministry, headed by Basil Rajapaksa.13 
Since the provinces were managing some of these programs, the court ruled that all 
nine provincial councils, under the powers granted them by the thirteenth amend-
ment, were required to approve the legislation.14 
The government reacted angrily, organising a campaign against the chief justice 
in the influential government media and sponsoring street demonstrations. Two 
weeks after issuing an unusual statement condemning these and other moves as an 
 
 
12 The action plan argued that the relationship of the police service to the defence ministry is “an 
entirely policy/political issue”. Other proposed rule of law reforms suffer a similar fate. In a report 
delivered to Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa on 24 January 2013, an army board of inquiry 
charged with examining the LLRC’s recommendations found that “the Police in Sri Lanka should be 
placed under the Ministry of Defence at all times”, arguing that this is necessary in countries that 
“face wide spread internal disorders”. “Report of the Army Board on Implementation of the Rec-
ommendations of the Lessons Learnt & Reconciliation Commission”, January 2013, ch. 4, para. 28. 
13 For a valuable analysis and critique of the Divineguma bill, see Centre for Policy Alternative, 
“Basic Guide on the key provisions in the Divineguma Bill”, 3 October 2012. 
14 Some analysts argue that the Rajapaksa government was also angered by a similar ruling by the 
court a year earlier on the Town and Country Planning Act, which also saw the court force the gov-
ernment to submit the bill for approval from all provinces. See Tisaranee Gunasekera, “The Im-
peachment as a primer on the Rajapaksa way”, Colombo Telegraph, 24 January 2013. 
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attack on the independence of the judiciary, a senior judge and head of the judicial 
services commission was attacked and badly beaten by armed men.15  
On 1 November, government parliamentarians initiated impeachment proceed-
ings against Bandaranayake, charging her with fourteen counts of misconduct. She 
rejected all the charges and launched a strong public campaign to defend herself, 
with the support of an unusually broad coalition featuring the bar association, the 
leaders of all Sri Lanka’s major religions and civil society activists, as well as most of 
the opposition.  
Despite the widespread public resistance, a government-dominated parliamen-
tary select committee found Bandaranayake guilty on 8 December on three counts of 
misconduct.16  
In addition to its unusual speed, the work of the parliamentary select committee 
was widely criticised for its rejection of basic tenets of due process.17 Composed of a 
seven-four majority of government members, many of whom had already expressed 
their belief in the chief justice’s guilt, the committee denied her sufficient time and 
information to prepare her defence, denied her access to documents and evidence 
used by the panel members, and refused to provide her legal team a list of witnesses 
or an opportunity to cross-examine them. Witnesses were called only after she had 
quit the hearings in protest at verbal abuse by government members and the denial 
of her due process rights. 
In mid-December, the court of appeal requested the parliamentary select com-
mittee to postpone a final decision on impeachment until it had a chance to rule on a 
number of lawsuits against the process. The court summoned the members of the 
committee, as the Supreme Court had earlier in a separate case. The speaker of par-
liament – the president’s brother, Chamal Rajapaksa – and the government mem-
bers of the committee rejected both requests, citing “the supremacy of parliament”.18 
On 3 January, the Supreme Court ruled that the parliamentary standing orders un-
der which the chief justice had been tried did not meet constitutional requirements. 
The court of appeal followed on 7 January by formally quashing the parliamentary 
select committee’s conviction of the chief justice. 
Defying clear rulings from Sri Lanka’s two highest courts, as well as strong do-
mestic opposition and growing expressions of international concern,19 parliament 
 
 
15 “Secretary of the Judicial Services Commission was assaulted by a group of unidentified men”, 
Colombo Telegraph, 7 October 2012; International Commission of Jurists, “Sri Lanka: ICJ deplores 
attack on the Secretary of the Judicial Services Commission”, 9 October 2012. 
16 “Sri Lanka Chief Justice found guilty on 3 charges”, Colombo Page (www.colombopage.com), 
8 February 2013. She was declared guilty of interfering with a case involving a company from which 
her sister bought an apartment, not declaring dormant bank accounts and remaining in office while 
her husband faced a bribery charge. Amal Jayasinghe, “Sri Lanka impeaches chief justice”, Austral-
ian Associated Press, 12 January 2013. 
17 Rules of evidence and due process that are routine in formal judicial proceedings do not apply 
under the parliamentary procedures that govern impeachments.  
18 “PSC stays out of Appeal Court”, Daily News, 3 January 2013. 
19 Calls to refrain from pursuing the impeachment came from the U.S., the EU, the Commonwealth 
secretary general, the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, and many 
lawyers associations around the world. Criticism was even stronger after the chief justice was re-
moved. See, for instance, “Removal of Chief Justice ‘calamitous setback’ for rule of law in Sri Lanka 
– UN official”, UN News Centre, 18 January 2013; “Dismissal of the Chief Justice in Sri Lanka”, 
Commonwealth secretary general, 13 January 2013; and “Sri Lanka: Judges around the world con-
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voted by a two-thirds majority to impeach the chief justice on 11 January, and two 
days later, the president ratified the decision and formally removed the chief justice 
from office. On 15 January, the president appointed the presidential legal adviser and 
former attorney general, Mohan Peiris, to replace Bandaranayake.20 
The pursuit of the impeachment was won partly in the street. Plans by Bandara-
nayake to insist on her legitimacy as chief justice by appearing in court as scheduled 
on 15 January were prevented when heavily armed paramilitary police were sta-
tioned surrounding the Supreme Court to block her access. That same day she was 
forced to leave her official residence and prevented by the police from giving a press 
conference.21 Government-sponsored posters and state media attacked many of the 
lawyers and activists who led the opposition to the impeachment. In the following 
days, at least four senior lawyers received death threats from a hitherto unknown 
vigilante group, “Patriotic Taskforce”.22  
B.  Investigations into Serious Crimes  
The past year has seen no progress in investigating any of the hundreds of alleged 
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances committed over the past seven 
years. This is despite the detailed recommendations of the LLRC to “credibly investi-
gate widespread allegations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances” 
and the many international calls for action, not least from the HRC. Instead, political 
killings and abductions continued in 2012, though the number of incidents appears 
to have diminished in the second half of the year.23 
The government has stated that the attorney general has requested the police 
to reopen the investigation into the 2006 massacre of seventeen aid workers with 
 
 
demn impeachment of Chief Justice Dr Shirani Bandaranayake”, International Commission of 
Jurists, 23 January 2013. 
20 Known as a Rajapaksa loyalist, Peiris has been criticised for his statements before the UN Com-
mittee on Torture in November 2011 that he had information that the disappeared Sri Lanka jour-
nalist Prageeth Ekneliyagoda had in fact left the country for personal reasons and was still alive. 
When he was later called to court in Sri Lanka as part of a habeas corpus hearing and asked to ex-
plain and substantiate the claim, Peiris reportedly said “we do not know the truth or falsity” of the 
information and could not recall the source. “Sri Lankan official has ‘no idea’ of reporter’s fate”, 
BBC, 5 June 2012; and “The credibility gap”, Ceylon Today (www.ceylontoday.lk), 7 June 2012. 
Peiris has also been criticised for dismissing, while attorney general in 2011, separate rape and 
murder charges against two government parliamentarians. “No way out for MR’s Govt”, The Sun-
day Leader, 20 January 2013; “Chandana Kathriarachchi sentenced”, Daily Mirror, 27 June 2011; 
“Attorney General wrong to withdraw charges – CJ”, BBC, 17 April 2011.  
21 A lawyers’ demonstration against the impeachment on 10 January was attacked and dispersed by 
government supporters. “Thugs, hooligans attack lawyers, police look on”, The Sunday Times, 13 
January 2013. Pro-government crowds, including some senior ministers, celebrated the parlia-
ment’s impeachment outside the chief justice’s residence with firecrackers and traditional Sri Lankan 
celebratory food. “And then they came for the judges”, The Economist, 19 January 2013; “New con-
stitutional crisis with two CJs”, Daily Mirror, 16 January 2013.  
22 “Lawyers get threatening letters”, Daily Mirror, 17 January 2013. This followed a poster cam-
paign – tolerated if not organised by the government – attacking anti-impeachment protests as the 
work of traitors. “Two-day debate on impeachment begins”, Hindu, 10 January 2013. Threats 
against lawyers opposed to the impeachment continue to be reported. “Anti-impeachment lawyers 
being hunted countrywide: Lawyers Collective”, DailyFT, 15 February 2013. 
23 A study presented detailed evidence of 57 abductions and disappearances in the first six months 
of 2012. See Watchdog, “A disappearance every five days in post-war Sri Lanka”, Groundviews 
(www.groundviews.org), 30 August 2012. 
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Action contre la faim (ACF) and the killing of five students in Trincomalee.24 In both 
cases there is strong evidence implicating government security forces.25 To date, 
there is no indication that substantive action has been taken in either case.26  
The lack of progress in investigations is not surprising given the government’s 
categorical rejection of any independent processes or institutions aimed at effective-
ly challenging impunity for politically motivated disappearances and extrajudicial 
killings. The action plan, for instance, ignored the LLRC’s key recommendation to 
appoint a “special commissioner of investigation”, provided with “experienced in-
vestigators” to look into alleged disappearances (para. 9.51). Instead, the govern-
ment undertook merely “to invoke the present procedures as available in the Code of 
Criminal Procedures with priority given to such complaints”.27 
The plan offered only vague responses to the LLRC’s call to “take immediate steps 
to ensure that these allegations are properly investigated into [sic] and perpetrators 
brought to justice” (para. 9.46). Instead of independent investigations and prosecu-
 
 
24 The government’s national report to the HRC’s universal periodic review (UPR) states that the 
two cases “were referred to the Attorney-General to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists to 
launch prosecutions. The Attorney-General has advised the Inspector-General of Police to conduct 
further investigations”. “National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to 
Human Rights Council resolution 16/21”, A/HRC/WG.6/14/LKA/1, 10 August 2012, para. 31 (here-
after cited as “National Report to UPR”). The action plan agreed to implement the recommenda-
tions of an earlier (2007-2009) commission of inquiry, headed by retired Supreme Court Justice N. 
Udalagama, that looked into these and other major human rights cases. That report remains un-
published, however, and its recommendations are unknown, so effective investigations and prose-
cutions are far from guaranteed. See Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, op. cit, 
pp. 8 and 22-6. 
25 Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, op. cit.; “Twenty years of make-believe: 
Sri Lanka’s Commissions of Inquiry”, Amnesty International, 11 June 2009; “Unfinished Business 
of the Five Students and ACF Cases”, University Teachers for Human Rights, Special Report No. 30, 
1 April 2008; “Joint Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review”, Action contre la 
faim and SPEAK Human Rights & Environmental Initiative, October 2012. 
26 The action plan also committed the government to “conduct investigations speedily and ensure 
that the Rule of Law prevails” with regard to a set of specific allegations relating to government-
linked armed groups and their leaders brought to the attention of the LLRC. The plan named as its 
possible targets “Bhareti [better known as Iniya Barathi], Karuna [V. Muralitharan, formerly head 
of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), now vice-president of the ruling Sri Lanka Free-
dom Party (SLFP)], EPDP [Eelam People’s Democratic Party] extortion, and a gang led by a person 
called Major Seelan”. Although the plan promised action within six months, to date, the govern-
ment has released no indications of progress. More generally, the action plan rejected the LLRC’s 
call for “proper investigations in respect of allegations against the illegal armed groups with a view 
to … institut[ing] criminal proceedings against offenders” (para. 9.73). The LLRC report cited ex-
tensive testimony and other evidence alleging criminal activities by pro-government parties EPDP 
and TMVP, which both parties deny. Yet in response, the action plan simply declared that while “il-
legal armed groups were known to operate” during the war, “steps have been taken to completely 
eliminate this activity” and promises that “these measures will be continued to be implemented to 
ensure that these groups do not re-emerge”. Credible reports, especially from the north, suggest 
such groups continue to operate. Crisis Group telephone interviews, community activists and jour-
nalists, December 2012 and January 2013. See also “LLRC pussyfoots around Iniya Bharathi- 
TNA”, The Sunday Leader, 29 January 2012. 
27 The action plan was also entirely silent on the LLRC’s call for the government to implement the 
many recommendations of past commissions of inquiry into disappearances, in particular its rec-
ommendation for “a special mechanism to address this issue and deter future occurrences” (para. 
9.48). The plan finessed the LLRC recommendation to enact a law to criminalise enforced and in-
voluntary disappearances, promising only that the issue will by considered over the next two years 
and action taken “if law reform is found to be necessary”. 
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tions, the plan merely promises to “identify impediments, if any, to the effective en-
forcement of the law” and to “strengthen investigation skills of the police”. 
In response to the LLRC’s call to “investigate any such instances where there is 
prima facie evidence of conscription of children as combatants and ensure that of-
fenders are brought to justice” (para. 9.79), the action plan simply stated: “Investiga-
tions completed”. There has not been a single prosecution in any of the hundreds of 
cases of alleged forced conscription of children during the civil war by the LTTE and 
by various branches of the pro-government Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP).28  
Serious human rights abuses continue throughout the country, including regular 
kidnappings and killing of political opponents. The 7 April 2012 abduction of two 
dissident Sinhala Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) activists was notable for their 
being released following strong Australian pressure.29 Local media and rights activ-
ists documented scores of enforced disappearances in the first six months after the 
release of the LLRC report, including some that followed the HRC resolution. At-
tempts by the defence ministry to dismiss these claims have been challenged.30  
The LLRC says very little about allegations of rape or sexual violence and makes 
no specific recommendations on the issue. The action plan is entirely silent. Yet, there 
are regular and credible reports that violence against women, particularly in the 
north and east, continues at high levels, with no reforms or reported arrests of alleged 
perpetrators in the security forces since the Crisis Group December 2011 report on 
the issue.31 
C. Accountability  
Nearly a year after the HRC called on the Sri Lankan government to “address alleged 
violations of international law”,32 there have been no credible investigations into any 
of the hundreds “of credible allegations” of war crimes detailed in the April 2011 re-
 
 
28 In April 2012, the UN Secretary-General removed the Iniya Barathi faction from the UN list of 
groups using child soldiers. “Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General”, 26 
April 2012. The LTTE and the TMVP had been removed from the list in previous years. In its final 
report on Sri Lanka, ratified by the Security Council in December 2012, the Security Council’s 
Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict recommended the government “continue to ensure 
effective implementation of its “zero tolerance” policy on child recruitment, including through con-
tinued investigations of each reported case of recruitment by all armed groups, followed by prose-
cutions of those responsible, and to ensure appropriate follow-up to the report of the National Child 
Protection Authority on Iniya Bharathi”. “Conclusions on the situation of children and armed con-
flict in Sri Lanka”, Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, 21 December 2012. See also 
“Child soldiers in Sri Lanka not a ‘closed’ issue”, The Sunday Leader, 13 January 2013.  
29 “Abducted man believes diplomats saved him from death”, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 2012. 
30 “A Factual Analysis of Disappearances and Abductions”, defence ministry website (defence.lk), 
20 July 2012. This attempts to undermine claims found in two pieces by “Watchdog”: “New wave of 
abductions and dead bodies in Sri Lanka”, Groundviews (www.groundviews.org), 26 February 2012 
and “Horrible rise of disappearances in post-war Sri Lanka continues unabated”, Groundviews, 
5 April 2012. For Watchdog’s reply to the defence ministry’s critique, see “A disappearance every 
five days in post-war Sri Lanka”, op. cit. 
31 Crisis Group Report, Women’s Insecurity in Sri Lanka’s North and East, op. cit. According to aid 
workers in the north, some police accused of rape and sexual harassment of local women are occa-
sionally transferred to other locations, but none taken to court, as the victims fear antagonising 
authorities. Crisis Group interviews, February 2013. 
32 The resolution also calls on the government to “take all necessary additional steps to fulfil its rel-
evant legal obligations and commitment to initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, 
equity, accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans”. 
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port of the Secretary-General’s experts panel on accountability.33 While institution-
alised impunity has always made it unlikely that the government would undertake or 
allow independent investigations into the actions of its own security forces, account-
ability is even less likely with the judiciary now fully under the government’s control. 
As the HRC noted in its 2012 resolution, the LLRC report “does not adequately 
address serious allegations of violations of international law”.34 This assessment was 
confirmed by a detailed U.S. State Department report released in April 2012, which 
cited the serious failings of the LLRC’s limited and pro-military treatment of attacks 
on civilians in the final months of the war.35 Asserting that most civilians were likely 
killed “in crossfire” and downplaying evidence the government shelled hospitals,36 
the LLRC concluded that security forces generally conducted the war in accordance 
with international humanitarian law.37 
The LLRC did, however, recommend the government pursue three lines of in-
quiry into alleged violations: 
 “Ascertain more fully the circumstances under which specific instances of death or 
injury to civilians could have occurred,38 and if such investigations disclose wrong-
ful conduct, to prosecute and punish the wrongdoers” (paras. 9.9 and 9.37a). 
 “Launch a full investigation into allegations of disappearances after surrender/ 
arrest and where such investigations produce evidence of any unlawful act on the 
 
 
33 “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts”, op. cit. 
34 For a critique of the LLRC’s treatment of allegations of war crimes, see Crisis Group’s “Statement 
on the Report of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission”, op. cit. 
35 “Report to Congress: Measures Taken by the Government of Sri Lanka and International Bodies 
To Investigate and Hold Accountable Violators of International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law”, State Department Office of Global Criminal Justice, 4 April 2012. www.state.gov/j/gcj/srilanka/ 
releases/187408.htm. (The report is accompanied by a longer, and valuable, “Factual Supple-
ment”.) It finds that “the LLRC’s recommendations fail to adequately address accountability for vio-
lations of IHL [international humanitarian law] and IHRL [international human rights law] by gov-
ernment security forces and LTTE cadres during the conflict”. It also affirmed that “since the LLRC 
report was released, culpable individuals have not been identified by a credible mechanism, and no 
one has been held to account”. This remains the case almost a year later.  
36 On the shelling of hospitals, of which there is much eyewitness testimony available in the public 
domain indicating government responsibility, the LLRC said that, although it was unable to deter-
mine responsibilities, given the significant number of testimonies confirming hospitals had been 
shelled, “consideration should be given to the expeditious grant of appropriate redress to those affect-
ed after due inquiry as a humanitarian gesture which would instil confidence in the reconciliation 
process” (para. 9.14). 
37 The LLRC found that the military’s actions in the final phase of the war “evidenc[ed] a carefully 
worked out strategy of avoiding civilian casualties or minimizing them.… consistent with the posi-
tion that protection of civilian life was a key factor in the formulation of a policy for carrying out 
military operations” and “against any proposition that deliberate targeting of civilians was part and 
parcel of a policy…” (paras. 9.4-9.5). 
38 While the LLRC report discusses eight specific reported cases of intentional military attacks on 
civilians, its final recommendations only cite three incidents as meriting further inquiry, though its 
phrasing is ambiguous: “Investigate the specific instances referred to in observation 4.359 vi. (a) 
and (b) and any reported cases of deliberate attacks on civilians. If investigations disclose the 
commission of any offences, appropriate legal action should be taken to prosecute/punish the of-
fenders” (para. 4.360, emphasis added). The April 2012 State Department report argues that “the 
LLRC report does not call for investigations … other than the three instances briefly discussed in 
the report”. “Factual Supplement”, op. cit. 
Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°243, 20 February 2013 Page 11 
 
 
 
 
part of individual members of the Army, prosecute and punish the wrongdoers” 
(para. 9.23). 
 “Initiate an independent investigation into [the UK Channel 4 video] to establish the 
truth or otherwise of the allegations arising from the video footage” (para. 9.39). 
To date, the government has failed to undertake independent investigations. The 
action plan promised only that the military will within a year “complete [its] ongoing 
disciplinary process being conducted in terms of Armed Forces statutes”, looking 
into any violations that led to deaths or disappearances. “Upon conclusion, [the gov-
ernment will] take follow up action to prosecute, where relevant”, “us[ing] the exist-
ing system as provided for in the Criminal Procedure Code”. The government gave 
itself five years to complete the whole process.39 
After releasing very little information about the nature of its “ongoing discipli-
nary processes”, the army announced on 15 February 2013 that a five-member court 
of inquiry had delivered the first of a two-part report to the army commander.40 Ac-
cording to the army, “evidence before the Court has conclusively established that the 
[military’s] Humanitarian Operation was conducted strictly in accordance with the 
‘Zero Civilian Casualty’ directive” and that “the instances of shellings [sic] referred to 
in the LLRC Report were not caused by the Sri Lanka Army and civilian casualties 
might have occurred due to unlawful acts by LTTE”.41 No prosecutions or discipli-
nary actions were announced.42 
With progress by the government on investigations into, and accountability for, 
grave violations of the laws of war, next to impossible, an international investigation 
remains the only plausible process for learning the truth, holding perpetrators to 
account and defending the laws of war. 
 
 
39 The action plan also rejected the LLRC’s call for an independent analysis of the Channel 4 video 
to “establish the truth or otherwise” of the summary executions it appears to depict (para. 9.39). 
The plan promised only to “assess the current processes being pursued to examine the authenticity 
of the allegations in Channel 4, namely the inquiry currently conducted by the Army”. Once again, 
the army is tasked with investigating its own possible criminal misconduct. 
40 “Inquiry reveals that the instances of shellings were not caused by the army”, Sri Lanka army 
website (www.army.lk), 15 February 2013. A year earlier, the government announced that a five-
member army court of inquiry, headed by a major general, had been formed. “Army chief appoints 
Court of Inquiry”, Daily News, 16 February 2012. In November, as the HRC was conducting its uni-
versal periodic review, senior Sri Lankan minister Mahinda Samarasinghe announced that the 
court had met “approximately 30 times” and was investigating 50 incidents. According to Samara-
singhe: “Investigations cover whether or not any attacks were carried out by the Army on civilians, 
on hospitals or in the no-fire zones including the specific instances referred to in the LLRC Report. 
Irrespective of whether the Channel 4 story is authentic or not, the Court of Inquiry has been man-
dated to take measures to ascertain whether the uniformed persons featured in the Channel 4 foot-
age can be identified as members of the Sri Lanka Army, and other violations of military law, if 
any”. “Samarasinghe tells UPR army probing allegations”, Island, 3 November 2012. 
41 The court of inquiry is also said to have found that “at all stages of the Humanitarian Operation, 
the Sri Lanka Army behaved as a well-disciplined military force observing the IHL and the law of 
war and they took all the precautions to avoid civilian casualties and all those who came under the 
control of the Sri Lanka Army, including surrendered/captured LTTE cadres, were treated humane-
ly observing the IHL to the letter”. “Inquiry reveals that the instances of shellings were not caused 
by the army”, op. cit.  
42 According to the army, the court of inquiry “will now proceed to investigate the 2nd part of their 
mandate, to wit Channel 4 allegation on summary executions of captured LTTE terrorists”. Ibid. 
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D.  The Detention System 
Alarmed at the large numbers of Sri Lankans detained in arbitrary, illegal ways, and 
concerned with the difficulty of getting reliable information of who is held and 
where, the LLRC made a series of important and wide-ranging recommendations for 
reforms of the detention system. Unfortunately, the government has done next to 
nothing to implement them, with the action plan rejecting or ignoring the bulk of the 
proposals.43 
1. Long-term detainees held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 
Expressing “concern over some detainees who have been incarcerated over a long 
period of time without charges”, the LLRC held that “conclusive action should be 
taken to dispose of these cases by bringing charges or releasing them where there is 
no evidence of any criminal offence having being committed” (para. 970). It also 
urged the government to “appoint an Independent Advisory Committee to monitor 
and examine detention and arrest of persons taken into custody under any regula-
tions made under the Public Security Ordinance or the Prevention of Terrorism Act” 
(paras. 5.44 and 9.57).  
The action plan made no commitment to release detainees against whom there is 
no evidence and it rejected the proposed independent advisory committee, choosing 
instead to “identify and establish procedures in the existing system to address the 
issue”. It promised that a “dedicated unit in the Attorney General’s Dept.” will work 
to reduce the number of detainees over the next two years and will report back by 
the end of 2012 on means to “ease the backlog” of cases.  
To date, no information has been made public on the situation of long-term de-
tainees.44  
 
 
43 For instance, the action plan ignored the LLRC’s position that “no person should be detained in 
any place other than” “formally designated” “authorized places of detention” (9.67). It also takes no 
note of the LLRC’s recommendation that law enforcement officials always issue a formal receipt of 
arrest and provide details of the place of detention (9.67) nor its reminder of the obligation to pros-
ecute those who fail to record an arrest, detention or transfer, or complaints of abductions (5.42). 
The action plan claimed merely that it will “continue current practice of informing next of kin re-
garding location of detainee” and notes that “NHRC (the national human rights commission) is also 
informed”. In practice, however, as the LLRC itself notes, many next of kin are never informed 
about where their family member has been taken and frequently spend long periods in anxious, of-
ten fruitless, search. The human rights commission is in fact rarely informed about detentions and 
has little ability in practice to assist families or visit detainees. Crisis Group telephone interviews, 
lawyers and activists, Colombo, January 2013. The action plan also ignored a whole set of recom-
mendations by the LLRC designed to protect detainees from abuse and families from unnecessary 
trauma. This includes the principles that “an arrested person should be promptly produced before a 
Magistrate to be dealt with in accordance with the law; any change of the place of detention should 
be promptly notified to the family of the arrested person and the Human Rights Commission of Sri 
Lanka; magistrates should visit the places of detention every month; [and] release from detention 
should be done through courts” (para. 5.41). 
44 The government informed the HRC in August 2012 that 383 suspected ex-LTTE combatants “are 
under judicially mandated custody (remand)”, but it gave no figure for the number of long-term 
detainees still held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). “National Report to UPR”, op. cit., 
para. 23. Colombo-based lawyers who handle such cases estimate there are roughly 500 pending as 
of February 2013, and that some of these detainees are being sent for rehabilitation in order to ex-
pedite their release. Since 2009, more than one third of long-term detainees are estimated to have 
been freed, released on bail or transferred to the rehabilitation system. Crisis Group telephone in-
terview, February 2013.  
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2.  “Rehabilitation” 
The government regularly trumpets the success of its “rehabilitation” program for 
those detained at the end of the war on suspicion of involvement with the LTTE. It 
claims to have released virtually all of the nearly 12,000 people originally detained.45 
This is likely true, but there remains significant uncertainty about the numbers orig-
inally and currently detained.46 Government officials regularly release new, but often 
conflicting, numbers, with no independent verification procedures.47 There have also 
been serious concerns from the beginning about the lack of clear legal criteria under 
which the “rehabilitees” were being held and the clear lack of due process rights.48  
Determining the exact number of those detained in the “Preventive Accommoda-
tion and Rehabilitation Centres” (PARCS) is difficult in part because the government 
regularly shuttles detainees between the rehabilitation system and its prisons and 
detention centres for long-term detainees.49 It has also begun to use the “rehabilita-
tion” system, now operating under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), to punish 
political dissent. In November 2012, four Tamil student activists at Jaffna University 
were arrested under the PTA and sent to the Welikanda rehabilitation centre.50  
 
 
45 The government stressed that, as of the end of July 2012, “from approximately 12,000 persons, 
at present 636 beneficiaries are undergoing rehabilitation, and 383 are under judicially mandated 
custody (remand)”. “National Report to UPR”, op. cit., para. 23. 
46 On 13 January 2013, the government released 313 detainees from one of its Protective Accom-
modation and Rehabilitation Centres (PARCS). One news report of the release, citing government 
officials, stated that 12,000 suspected ex-LTTE members had been released from the rehabilitation 
system, with 430 more due to be released “soon”. “313 Rehabilitated LTTE members released”, 
Lankasri News (lankasrinews.com), 13 January 2013. According to a news item of the same event 
on one of the government official news sites, “of the over 11,600 former rebel cadres surrendered to 
the military at the end of war in 2009, only a few hundred remain in rehabilitation camps now”. 
“Govt allocates more funds for rehabilitation of ex-LTTE cadres”, Sri Lankan government website 
(www.priu.gov.lk), 15 January 2013. Meanwhile, the website of the Bureau of the Commissioner 
General of Rehabilitation gives 11,989 as the total number of people to be “reintegrated” through 
the government rehabilitation program. However, in December 2009, Sri Lanka’s ambassador to 
the UN, Palitha Kohona, stated “over 12,700 former combatants have been identified among the 
IDPs so far”. “The ‘Elders’ statement on IDPs in Sri Lanka – sadly outdated and inaccurate – Dr. 
Kohona”, Asian Tribune (www.asiantribune.com), 5 December 2009.  
47 With the government denying the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN 
refugee agency (UNHCR) access to its initial screening points for those fleeing the war zone or sur-
rendering to security forces in 2009, it has never been possible to know how many people were de-
tained at the end of the war. While the government allowed the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) ac-
cess to the nearly 600 children detained after recruitment by the LTTE, it prevented the ICRC and 
all other groups access to any of the adult “rehabilitation” centres from the end of July 2009. Alt-
hough the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was allowed to meet “rehabilitees” in 
order to undertake socio-economic profiling, it had only very limited and monitored access to the 
centres and, unlike the ICRC, has no protection monitoring mandate or expertise. For earlier dis-
cussions of government treatment of surrendered and suspected ex-combatants, see Crisis Group 
Reports, Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever, op. cit., pp. 17-18, and Sri Lanka’s North I, 
op. cit., pp. 10-12. 
48 For two valuable studies of the legal and procedural failings of Sri Lanka’s detention and rehabili-
tation system for surrendered or suspected LTTE members, see Valkyrie, “Reconciliation through 
‘Rehabilitation’ & ‘Reintegration’ of Ex-LTTE members in Sri Lanka: Separating Fact from Fiction”, 
Groundviews (www.groundviews.org), 19 October 2010, and International Commission of Jurists, 
“Beyond Lawful Constraints: Sri Lanka’s Mass Detention of LTTE Suspects”, September 2010.  
49 See Sri Lanka’s North I, op. cit., p. 10, note 73. 
50 They were arrested for helping organise public commemorations of Tamil war dead, including 
those killed while fighting with the LTTE. See Section II.E. below. 
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3. Database of detainees 
The LLRC called on the government in both its interim and final reports, to establish 
“a centralized comprehensive database containing a list of detainees, which should 
be made available to the next of kin with names, place of detention as well as record 
of transfers so that families have access to such information” (para. 9.63). The action 
plan promised that within six months the defence ministry will “enhance” “the pre-
sent database”, “with easy access to information being available to NOK [next of kin]”. 
The current database, however, is reportedly difficult to access and is believed to list 
the names and locations only of those held by the Terrorist Investigation Depart-
ment (TID) of the police. It thus leaves out many, perhaps the majority, of detainees, 
and it is of no real help to the hundreds of families searching for those who have dis-
appeared but are not in detention.51  
The government should establish a transparent process for the arrest, detention 
and processing of detainees, one that guarantees basic rights of due process and the 
full range of protections recommended by the LLRC. In the absence of these reforms, 
parliament’s 22 January adoption of a new law that extends from one to two days the 
period that the police can detain a suspect before producing him before a court is 
particularly dangerous.52 
4. Prison violence  
The grave problems facing the detainees, including Tamil prisoners held for years 
without trial and often without charges, were highlighted by two separate prison in-
cidents in 2012.53 On 29 June, heavily armed commandos from the police Special 
Task Force (STF) stormed the prison in the northern town of Vavuniya to free three 
prison guards held by striking long-term Tamil inmates.54 Families of the inmates 
 
 
51 According to an expert on Sri Lankan detention issues, “while a detainees database is required, 
this doesn’t really address the issue of the missing, which the government conflates with the issue of 
the detainees database in an effort to create the impression that a detainees database would provide 
answers to families of the missing. Even the TNA conflates the issue and calls for a database when 
they talk of the missing, as if establishing a database is going to result in families finding out the 
whereabouts of their missing loved ones. The majority of those who are looking for their family 
members are those whose loved ones went missing during the last stages or surrendered to or were 
arrested by the SLA [Sri Lankan army] and thereafter disappeared. The database is not going to ad-
dress their issue”. Crisis Group email correspondence, February 2013. 
52 “Parliament passes Code of Criminal Procedure Bill”, Sri Lankan government website (www.priu. 
gov.lk), 23 January 2013. The bill, which also gives the attorney general new powers to respond to 
“public disquiet”, was strongly criticised by rights groups and the opposition as designed to stifle 
dissent. For the JVP’s criticisms, see “48 hour detention bill – a repressive bulldozer turned against 
masses”, Lankatruth, 1 February 2013. For the government’s defence of the bill, see Manjula Fer-
nando, “Move to check crime”, The Sunday Observer, 27 January 2013.  
53 There have been in the past other even bloodier incidents in Sri Lankan prisons and detention 
centres: more than 50 Tamil political prisoners were killed in Welikada prison in Colombo in July 
1983, during the island-wide anti-Tamil riots, while in October 2000, 27 inmates were killed and 
fourteen injured when a Sinhala mob stormed a low-security “rehabilitation centre” for suspected 
members of Tamil militant groups. No one was ever successfully prosecuted in either case. See Ra-
jan Hoole, Sri Lanka: The Arrogance of Power: Myths, Decadence & Murder (UTHR(J), 2001), ch. 
10, “The Welikade Prison Massacres”; and Alan Keenan, “Making Sense of Bindunuwewa: From 
Massacre to Acquittals”, Law and Society Trust Review, vol. 15, issue 212 (June 2005). 
54 “Parents of dead Sri Lankan Tamil prisoner ‘denied last rites’”, BBC, 9 July 2012 and “Sri Lanka 
‘must seek’ UN help over deadly prison violence”, BBC, 15 August 2012.The inmates were reportedly 
protesting the transfer of a fellow prisoner and were holding the guards hostage until prison officials 
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and Tamil politicians accused the STF and prison officials of subjecting the recap-
tured inmates to severe beatings as punishment for the uprising.55 32 inmates had to 
be transferred to hospitals, some in intensive care; two later died of their injuries.56 
Despite demands from family members, activists and opposition politicians, there 
has been no independent investigation.  
Just months later, on 9 November, the STF was involved in an even more deadly 
incident, when at least 27 prisoners were killed and more than 59 people injured 
during a day-long siege and gun battle in Colombo’s main Welikada prison.57 Some 
families and activists claim that many of the inmates killed were in fact murdered by 
the STF and army reinforcements after they had regained control of the prison.58  
E. Freedom of Expression 
Expressing concern about the failure to “conclusively investigate” and “bring to jus-
tice” those responsible for “attacks on journalists and media institutions and killing 
of journalists”, the LLRC urged the government to “expeditiously conclude investiga-
tions [into past attacks] so that offenders are brought to book without delay”. It also 
said that “all steps should be taken to prevent harassment and attacks on media per-
sonnel and institutions” (para. 9.115), in order to “promote and protect the right of 
freedom of expression for all”. 
Since the release of the LLRC report, however, there has been no progress in 
holding anyone to account for any of the more than dozen attacks on journalists 
since 2006, including the January 2009 murder of Sunday Leader editor Lasantha 
Wickrematunga and the 2010 disappearance of political cartoonist Prageeth Ekneli-
yagoda.59 The action plan promised only that within twelve months the police and 
media ministries – neither of which has shown a willingness or ability to address the 
crisis – would “take appropriate action to ensure media freedom” and “complete 
investigations into current cases”. 
 
 
produced the missing prisoner to prove he was alive and had not been tortured. The government 
claimed that among the prisoners were senior LTTE commanders. “How the Vavuniya prisoner re-
bellion was crushed by the STF”, The Nation, 8 July 2012. 
55 See “Three urgent demands submitted to President Rajapaksa over Vavuniya jail issue”, DBS 
Jeyaraj blog (dbsjeyaraj.com), 5 July 2012. 
56 A government doctor declared that the first inmate, Ganesan Nimalaruban, had died of heart 
failure. His family was denied for weeks the right to claim his body and bury him in his home village 
near Vavuniya. “Parents of dead Sri Lankan Tamil prisoner ‘denied last rites’”, op. cit. The second 
murdered prisoner, Dilrukshan Mariadas, had reportedly been missing for years. His parents did 
not know he was alive until they visited him in the hospital, in a coma. Athula Withanage, “‘Vavu-
niya killing is just the tip of the iceberg’ - Mano Ganesan”, Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka, 
13 July 2012. 
57 Violence reportedly erupted when the mostly Sinhalese prisoners resisted STF efforts to seize 
drugs and other contraband. “Prisoners at war”, The Sunday Times, 11 November 2012. 
58 The government claimed the prisoners had obtained weapons and were killed in exchanges of 
fire. “Sri Lanka’s prison clash ‘a massacre’”, BBC, 11 November 2012. The government has reported-
ly appointed a three-member commission of inquiry into the Welikada killings and the Human 
Rights Commission has launched a separate probe. “Justice in the aftermath”, Ceylon Today (www. 
ceylontoday.lk), 18 November 2012. 
59 “Call for truth about cartoonist’s disappearance three years ago”, Reporters Without Borders, 24 
January 2013. 
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In the first six weeks of 2013, two Tamil newspaper distributors in Jaffna were 
physically assaulted,60 while a journalist with the Jaffna-based Tamil newspaper 
Uthayan was badly beaten in December 2012.61 Uthayan’s editor was forced into ex-
ile in mid-2012 after being seriously assaulted.62 While violence against journalists 
in the south is less frequent than before, attacks continue: on 15 February 2013, 
an investigative journalist specialising in corruption issues was shot and seriously 
wounded.63 Threats to harm those who challenge or ask difficult questions of the gov-
ernment remain common. In October 2012, Sunday Leader editor Fredrica Jansz 
fled Sri Lanka with her family and is now seeking political asylum following a series 
of threats.64 Despite his public threats to “break the limbs” of Sri Lankan activists 
who had lobbied in support of the March 2012 HRC resolution in Geneva, Mervyn 
Silva remains a cabinet minister, with no official reprimand or public criticism by 
the president or other senior officials.65  
In July 2012, the government announced new regulations to monitor and control 
websites that publish anything the government deems to be news.66 Under revisions 
to the Press Council Act being approved by the cabinet but not yet law,67 the pun-
ishments for anyone found by the government to have misused the sites would be 
severe. Numerous websites critical of the government remain blocked for Sri Lankan 
readers.68 In June 2012, the offices of two news sites associated with the United Na-
tional Party (UNP) were raided and temporarily closed and charges filed against the 
staff.69 The charges were later dropped after widespread national and international 
protest, though court proceedings are ongoing.70 The government continues to resist 
calls, including from the LLRC, to enact a right to information bill.71  
 
 
60 Ramanan Veerasingham, “Tamil newspaper distributor attacked in garrison town of Jaffna”, 
Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka, 7 February 2013. 
61 “Uthayan journalist allegedly assaulted while taking pictures”, The Sunday Times, 2 December 2012. 
62 “Media freedom needs closer attention in Sri Lanka’s post-war politics”, International Federation 
of Journalists, 11 October 2012. 
63 “Sri Lanka Sunday Leader reporter Faraz Shauketaly shot”, BBC, 16 February 2013. 
64 Ben Doherty, “Editor seeks political refuge abroad”, The Age, 10 November 2012. For Jansz’s ac-
count of what she claims were Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s threats against her, see “Gota goes bezerk”, 
The Sunday Leader, 8 July 2012. Rajapaksa admits the conversation was an angry one, but denies 
he made any threats. “Gotabaya Rajapaksa responds to allegations by Frederica Jansz”, DBS Jeya-
raj blog (dbsjeyaraj.com), 14 July 2012.  
65 Silva is cabinet minister for public relations and public affairs. After a number of his closest aides 
were arrested for the January 2013 murder of a political rival and critic of Silva, he was forced to 
resign his position as the ruling party’s chief organiser of the important Kelaniya electorate. “Sri 
Lankan minister’s secretary accused of murder to make a confidential statement to magistrate”, Co-
lombo Page (www.colombopage.com), 1 February 2013. 
66 “Sri Lanka to bring laws, charge annual fees from news websites”, Lanka Business Online 
(www.lbo.lk), 12 July 2012. 
67 Katrina Kaiser, “Press freedom under attack In Sri Lanka: Website office raids and online content 
regulation”, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 30 July 2012. 
68 In addition, there are frequent ad hoc blocks on Tamil language news sites when they publish 
stories that anger authorities. See “A new spate of web censorship in Sri Lanka?”, Groundviews 
(www.groundviews.org), 26 June 2012. 
69 “Police raid Sri Lanka Mirror and Sri Lanka X News”, BBC, 29 June 2012.  
70 “Eight online journalists and an office assistant freed but investigation continues”, Reporters 
Without Borders, 4 July 2012; “Court releases Srilankamirror journalists”, Sri Lanka Mirror, 18 
September 2012. 
71 The action plan rejected the LLRC’s recommendation that “legislation should be enacted to ensure 
the right to information”, leaving it to the “Cabinet to decide the suitable time frame for drafting 
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Finally, disturbed by the numerous complaints of political meetings, protests and 
religious gatherings being prevented or broken up by the military and police, espe-
cially in the north, the LLRC requested the government to “ensure people, commu-
nity leaders, and religious leaders have the freedom to organize peaceful events and 
meetings without restrictions” (par 9.118). With the action plan merely promising 
that district secretaries and the public administration ministry would “monitor … 
whether there are constraints to enjoying this freedom”, there has been no improve-
ment since the release of the LLRC report.  
In late November 2012, military and police broke up lamp-lighting ceremonies 
conducted by Jaffna University students to commemorate civilians and LTTE fight-
ers killed in the war.72 Student protests the next day were violently dispersed by the 
police and military. Dozens of students were arrested or questioned over the next 
two weeks, with four student leaders sent for “rehabilitation” under the PTA.73 The 
police and military also regularly question northern Tamil politicians – including the 
leaders of the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF)74 and senior Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) parliamentarians75 – and have disrupted protests by both parties.76 
 
 
legislation”. The suggestion that such legislation might eventually be drafted ignores the govern-
ment’s failure to take up the draft legislation on the right to information that was prepared in 2004. 
In 2011, the government defeated an attempt by the opposition UNP to table its own freedom of 
information bill in parliament. “Govt. rejects our right to know”, The Sunday Times, 26 June 2011. 
72 The commemorations took place on 27 November, the LTTE’s traditional “heroes day”.  
73 Police and military officials were quoted as saying the students had links with the LTTE, which 
remains banned as a terrorist organisation in Sri Lanka. “Sri Lanka arrests: Jaffna police detain 
‘terror’ suspects”, BBC, 6 December 2012. Two students were freed on 22 January 2013, while the 
other two were released on 13 February on orders of President Rajapaksa. “Sri Lanka releases Tamil 
students”, Press Trust of India, 23 January 2013; “Release Jaffna undergrads – President”, Daily 
News, 13 February 2012. The students were the focus of widespread and sustained protest and lob-
bying by Tamil politicians and community leaders, as well as Tamil organisations in the diaspora. 
Despite intense pressure from the military, Jaffna University remained closed for nearly six weeks, 
as students, with the support of most faculties, boycotted classes, demanding the student leaders be 
freed. The university reopened on 8 January. See “Quiet efforts of Jaffna university vice-chancellor 
succeed in two undergraduates being released after rehabilitation”, DBS Jeyaraj blog (dbsjeya-
raj.com), 23 January 2013. According to a lawyer who followed the case, “to my knowledge lawyers 
were not allowed to visit them while they were at the rehab centre. Only parents and university offi-
cials had access”. Crisis Group email correspondence, February 2013. 
74 For instance, TNPF leader Gajen Ponnabalam was called for questioning by the Terrorism Inves-
tigation Department (TID) in late December 2012. TNPF offices are regularly visited and searched 
by police and the military. A poster denouncing and claiming to detail the alleged links of TNA and 
TNPF members with other pro-LTTE elements in Jaffna was distributed in the town in December 
2012, following the police and military crackdown on student protests and attempts to commemo-
rate Tamils who died in the war. The poster is widely believed to be the work of government securi-
ty services. Crisis Group telephone interview, community activists, January 2013. For a copy of the 
poster, see “Colombo posters wage war against all shades of Tamil nationalism”,TamilNet, 30 De-
cember 2012. 
75 On 12 January 2013, the offices of TNA parliamentarian S. Sritharan were raided by TID officers. 
The police reported finding explosives and illegal pornography. Sritharan’s private secretary was 
arrested – photos of him with a bag of condoms and watching pornographic videos on his computer 
were later leaked to the public. Sritharan and his staff deny the charges and claim the police planted 
the evidence. “TNA MP’s Sec: I was forced to watch porn while being videoed”, The Sunday Times, 
27 January 2013.  
76 “‘Crude oil attacks’ target TNPF organisers of civil protests: Gajendrakumar”,TamilNet, 17 July 
2012; “Jaffna peaceful protest disrupted by masked men”, Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka, 
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There have also been violent attacks by police on peaceful protests in Colombo and 
elsewhere in the south: military shootings of protesters in Negombo and Colombo in 
2012 remain unpunished.77  
F.  Demilitarisation of the North 
Attacks on political organising and protest in the north are only one of the many nega-
tive effects of the heavy presence of the military in the north and east, their intimate 
involvement in development activities and their de facto control over the civilian 
administration, as detailed in Crisis Group March 2012 reports.78 
The LLRC expressed its own concerns about the counterproductive effects of the 
military’s unprecedented role in the north and east and argued that “the Security 
Forces should disengage itself from all civil administration related activities as rap-
idly as possible” (par 9.134) so that “the Northern Province reverts to civilian admin-
istration in matters relating to the day-to-day life of the people … to enable the people 
to return to normal civilian life and enjoy the benefits of peace” (para. 9.227). In re-
sponse, the action plan tasked the defence ministry to “formulate [a] plan for further 
reducing involvement of Security Forces in civilian work” while asserting that “95% 
[of security forces are] already withdrawn from civilian duties”.79  
While there appears to have been a slight reduction in the number of troops in 
Jaffna, overall troop levels throughout the province remain extremely high.80 Ac-
cording to the best available estimates, some 150,000 soldiers are stationed in the 
north and east.81 The military continues to be deeply involved in civilian administra-
tion at all levels in the north and plays a central role in managing economic develop-
ment and physical reconstruction of the region, both directly and indirectly through 
retired Major General G.A. Chandrasiri, northern province governor, and the mili-
tary-dominated Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security 
– Northern Province. The military has also deepened its economic role in the north, 
 
 
18 July 2012. For more on the repression of political protest in the north, see Crisis Group Report, 
Sri Lanka’s North I, op. cit., pp. 13-16. 
77 “Fisherman killed as Sri Lankan police fire on protest”, World Socialist Website, 16 February 
2012; “A government not bound by the law”, The Sunday Times, 19 February 2012. 
78 Crisis Group Reports, Sri Lanka’s North I, and Sri Lanka’s North II, both op. cit. 
79 This final claim is meaningless, as there is no evidence given for what percentage of the military 
was earlier “engaged in civilian duties”, nor how many might be involved in determining develop-
ment policies and controlling civilian life in other ways. The government’s national report for the 
HRC’s universal periodic review claims that “the role of the military in the North today is confined 
solely to security related matters”, and that “the military is no longer involved in civil administra-
tion in the North and East and the Police Department now continues its responsibility of maintain-
ing law and order”. “National Report to UPR”, op. cit., para. 35-36 
80 According to the government, “with the termination of military operations and the gradual resto-
ration of normality, the strength of the military in the North has been reduced considerably. The 
present strength in the Jaffna Peninsula is approximately 15,000”. “National Report to UPR”, op. 
cit., para. 35. Jaffna represents only a small part of the northern province, and was not the centre of 
LTTE organisation in the final decade of the war, which role was filled by the much larger Vanni 
region, where most of the troops in the north are stationed. 
81 Crisis Group interviews, researchers, February 2013. For two separate well-researched estimates 
of troop numbers in the north and east, see “Notes on the Military Presence in Sri Lanka’s Northern 
Province”, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XLVII, no. 28, 14 July 2012; “How credible are the 
latest official claims concerning troop reductions in Jaffna?”, Groundviews (www.groundviews.org), 
10 July 2012. 
Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°243, 20 February 2013 Page 19 
 
 
 
 
including through new tourist resorts,82 and it continues to closely monitor the work 
of humanitarian organisations and local NGOs, as well as the local population as a 
whole. As a northern rights activist sums up: 
Militarisation is increasing, not decreasing … The military has actually been mak-
ing their role even more visible. They are doing everything, from teaching to sell-
ing vegetables, even tourism. And instead of demilitarising, the government is 
militarising new groups – including by recruiting vulnerable groups of Tamils, 
much like the LTTE.83 
G. Land Dispute Resolution  
The problem of internal displacement in Sri Lanka is far from resolved. While the 
government has claimed that “resettlement is now completed and no more IDPs [in-
ternally displaced persons] or IDP camps will be in the island”,84 independent ana-
lysts estimate 93,000 Sri Lankans – including many Muslims forced from the north 
in 1990 by the LTTE – remain internally displaced.85 
The military’s ongoing seizure of public and private land, especially in the north, 
is one of the chief sources of anger among Tamils and a major obstacle to reconcilia-
tion. While there has been since the end of the war a significant reduction of the ex-
tent of land held as high security zones, an estimated 26,000 people remain unable 
to return to their lands due to military occupation, with at least 18,000 in the Jaffna 
 
 
82 “Sri Lanka military opens more hotels, creates resort brand”, Lanka Business Online (www.lbo.lk), 
9 November 2012; Paul Miles, “Sri Lanka criticised over ‘war tourism’”, Daily Telegraph, 4 January 
2013. 
83 Crisis Group telephone interview, February 2013. The December 2012 hospitalisation under se-
cretive conditions of thirteen new Tamil women army recruits sparked controversy. According to 
eyewitnesses, some of them appeared psychologically distraught; concern was worsened when 
families and even government doctors were initially denied access to the women. “13 Tamil women 
recruited for army unexpectedly admitted to psychosomatic unit”, Uthayan (onlineuthayan.com), 
13 December 2012. The women were among more than 100 recent female recruits, many of whom 
later complained they were enlisted on false pretences, having been hired on non-standard con-
tracts and misled about the nature of their employment, salaries and work conditions. See “Tamil 
women coerced into joining the military – A statement of concern”, Women’s Action Network, 
December 2012. 
84 “All IDPs Resettled”, defence ministry website (defence.lk), 26 September 2012. A 300-page 
overview of post-war activities in the north published by the government offers more realistic, but 
still misleading claims about the progress of resettlement. See “From conflict to stability: Northern 
Province Sri Lanka”, Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security – North-
ern Province, January 2013.  
85 Most of these 93,000 live with host families. “Numbers of IDPs in Sri Lanka”, Internal Displace-
ment Monitoring Centre, 24 January 2013. The exact number of IDPs is impossible to know. The 
UN has not been allowed to conduct a census of the displaced population, despite the government 
committing to this in the 2012 Joint Plan of Assistance for the Northern Province. For an extensive 
discussion on this issue, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North II, op. cit. In addition to those 
displaced within Sri Lanka, there are also more than 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamils living as refugees 
in India, mostly in Tamil Nadu. Only about 6,000 have returned to Sri Lanka since the end of the 
war, with fewer arriving each year. Many cite security concerns as their reason to remain in India. 
“Sri Lanka: Refugees in India reluctant to return”, IRIN, 4 September 2012. “UNHCR: Over 1,200 
Lankan Tamils living in India return home”, Press Trust of India, 12 January 2013.For more on the 
situation of Sri Lankan refugees in India, see Crisis Group Report, India and Sri Lanka after the 
LTTE, op. cit. 
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peninsula alone.86 The government’s much publicised closure of the once huge Menik 
Farm displacement camps in August 2012 was achieved only by forcibly relocating to 
a new site the final 350 people whose land in the village of Kaeppapulavu has been 
seized by the military.87 
In spite of the LLRC’s concern that private lands in the north and east continued 
to be held by the military and other government agencies, often without compensat-
ing the owners, the action plan did not commit the government and its agencies to 
refrain from using private lands.88 At the same time, there are increasing numbers of 
credible reports of military officials in the north and east pressuring residents to sell 
their land to the military or to business interests to which local commanders are 
believed to have links.89 
Even in the best of situations, handling the many complex land issues and com-
peting claims from residents of the north and east would require the government to 
proceed carefully and with the active participation of all communities. Rather than 
offering reassurance that this will be its approach, the government’s plan to “imple-
ment” the LLRC’s recommendations raises numerous doubts, as it ignores or rejects 
many of the LLRC’s most serious concerns on issues of land.  
The LLRC recommended that in handling land disputes and distribution in the 
north, the government should “confine the participation of security forces officers to 
expediting the release of maximum extents of lands being utilized for security pur-
poses (para. 9.134)”.90 Rather than committing to this approach, the action plan 
 
 
86 “Update: May-November 2012”, IDP Protection Working Group, p. 5.  
87 “Sri Lanka: Final batch of Menik Farm IDPs relocated”, IRIN, 28 September 2012. “Relocated to 
nowhere”, Ceylon Today (www.ceylontoday.lk), 29 September 2012, and “Militarized charity and 
land grabbing: Experience of Keppapulavu in the Vanni”, Groundviews (www.groundviews.org), 15 
January 2013. For more on displacement from Keppapulavu, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s 
North II, op. cit., p. 19. The UN has been criticised by local activists and staff of humanitarian NGOs 
for not resisting what they considered the forced relocation of the Keppapulavu families. Crisis 
Group interviews, December 2012. UNHCR maintains that “international agencies were present 
during the move” and that “no overt coercion was witnessed. Although persons agreed to depart 
Menik Farm, most were clear that they agreed to a temporary move and did not consider Keppapu-
lavu to be, for them, the durable solution of relocation. They insisted instead on their preference for 
eventual return to their areas of origin. As a matter of principle, UN or other international organisa-
tions decided not to provide transport for this final group movement from Menik Farm to Keppapu-
lavu or reception assistance to persons once arriving. The humanitarian community continues to 
refrain from engagement with the Keppapulavu site until clear information (ideally in writing) is 
provided to affected populations from authorities about a schedule for future access to currently 
closed areas of origin, or compensation in lieu of access. ....UNHCR continues to consider these 
persons as still IDPs”. Crisis Group email interview, UNHCR official, Colombo, February 2013. In 
public statements at the time, the UN recognised that “military occupation of private homes and 
lands affects many people who have gone back to their villages in former conflict areas in the north” 
and that “it is important that the displaced people should be able to make an informed and volun-
tary decision about their future, including being part of the planning and management of their re-
settlement”. “Sri Lanka’s displacement chapter nears end with closure of Menik Farm”, UNHCR, 
27 September 2012; “UN hails closing of Sri Lankan displaced persons camp”, UN News Centre, 25 
September 2012. 
88 Instead, the plan promised within twelve months to “formulate a Policy to deal with the issue of 
settlements”. 
89 Crisis Group telephone and email interviews, human rights activists, February 2013. Local com-
manders are believed to receive a commission for land sold to such businesses. 
90 A July 2012 government circular on land issues in the north and east was struck down by the 
Court of Appeal, after being challenged by the TNA on multiple grounds, including the role given to 
 
Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°243, 20 February 2013 Page 21 
 
 
 
 
referred the issue to a proposed new “land commission”, which will “consider the 
feasibility of the implementation of such recommendations”. 
With regard to the many reports and growing evidence of government-supported 
movements of Sinhalese into the north and east, the LLRC proposed the government 
issue a statement of principle that “land policy of the Government is not an instrument 
to effect unnatural changes in the demographic pattern of a given Province” (para. 
9.124). The action plan refused to make such a commitment. 
H. Devolution of Power 
Prospects for a lasting political settlement have worsened considerably since mid-
2012, with little chance that the government will offer reforms that meet the aspira-
tions of even the most moderate Tamil political constituencies.91 Since breaking off 
talks with the TNA in January 2012, the government has made no serious efforts to 
return to the negotiating table. The TNA has made a number of major concessions in 
an attempt to start bilateral talks,92 but the government has insisted that discussions 
on constitutional reforms for power sharing and devolution of power take place 
through an all-party parliamentary select committee (PSC).93 
While the TNA has agreed in principle to join the PSC, they worry that it is mere-
ly a tactic for the government to avoid taking any position of its own and to prevent 
any expanded devolution. The Tamil party has therefore pressed the government to 
commit to at least a basic framework agreement before the PSC takes up the issue.94 
The parliament’s role in the impeachment of the chief justice has provided further 
grounds for TNA scepticism. The government has argued a PSC is needed in order to 
guarantee the wider political consensus needed for a lasting solution. The impeach-
ment reveals, however, that far from being an independent body, the parliament is in 
effect controlled by the executive and loyally carries out the policies of the president 
and the ruling family. 
Should the PSC ever take up the issue of devolution of power, a deal acceptable to 
Tamils seems increasingly unlikely. Reversing years of assurances to the interna-
tional community that the government would expand devolution beyond the current 
 
 
army officers in the various local committees empowered to handle land disputes. The attorney 
general assured the court that the circular would be withdrawn and policies reformulated, but the 
action plan promised to “ensure implementation” of the circular’s provisions. For more, see Crisis 
Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North I, op. cit., pp. 30-32. 
91 The LLRC found that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of suc-
cessive Governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil people” (para. 8.150). The re-
port called on the government “to launch a good faith effort to develop a consensus on devolution, 
building on what exists – both, for maximum possible devolution to the periphery especially at the 
grass roots level, as well as power sharing at the centre. This consensus should be one that will ena-
ble peoples’ participation in governance decisions affecting them and avoid costly and unnecessary 
duplication of political, bureaucratic and other institutional structures that hamper efficient, cost 
effective and transparent governance” (para. 8.225). 
92 For details, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka: Tamil Politics and the Quest for a Political Solu-
tion, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
93 The PSC, formally established by parliament in November 2011, would have a strong majority of 
members from the government coalition. The TNA, JVP and UNP have all refused to name their 
members, arguing that the government is not interested in serious negotiations. For more on the 
PSC, see ibid, pp. 9-10. 
94 The TNA’s suspicions have been fueled by the government’s repeated broken promises during 
bilateral negotiations. For details, see ibid, pp. 9-10. 
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constitution,95 President Rajapaksa and his brothers Basil and Gotabaya have re-
cently made clear their determination to weaken the powers of provincial councils 
through either the repeal or revision of the thirteenth amendment. In his November 
2012 budget speech to parliament, the president announced that “a change in the pre-
vailing Provincial Council system is necessary to make devolution more meaningful 
to our people. Devolution should not be a political reform that will lead us to separa-
tion but instead it should be one that unifies all of us …. The elimination of provin-
cial disparities using national standards is the main weapon through which national 
reconciliation can be promoted”.96  
The idea that centrally controlled economic development – rather than devolution 
of power – should be the main source of “reconciliation” has been a fundamental 
part of post-war policy but has been rejected by virtually all Tamils.97 Colombo-
driven and military-led development in the north and east has already badly dam-
aged the chances of reconciliation, increasing ethnic tensions and undermining the 
political and economic status of Tamils.98 Following the impeachment of the chief 
justice, a government move to weaken the provincial council system is now expected 
in 2013, perhaps even before the long-delayed elections to the northern provincial 
council, now promised for September 2013.99  
The powers of provincial councils are very limited, but with a regime so commit-
ted to further centralising power, control of the northern council is likely to be of less 
value than usual. The central government is reportedly already using staff and sys-
tems set up under the newly established department of Divineguma to consolidate 
the control of the north.100 The governor of the northern province, retired Major Gen-
eral G. Chandrasiri, has also actively asserted his powers, including through recent 
 
 
95 This includes promises made to the HRC and adopted in the council’s May 2009 pro-government 
resolution on Sri Lanka. For a longer list of government promises to senior international leaders, 
see ibid, p. 10. 
96 Annual Budget Speech to Parliament, 8 November 2012, full text available at www.srilanka 
guardian.org/2012/11/the-budget-speech-2013_8767.html. TNA leader R. Sampanthan criticised 
the president’s change in position in a strongly worded parliamentary rebuttal. See “If 13A modi-
fied, Lanka’s future in danger – Sampanthan”, Asian Tribune, 17 November 2012. For Gotabaya’s 
statements on the need to repeal the thirteenth amendment, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka: 
Tamil Politics and the Quest for a Political Solution, op. cit., p. 11. 
97 Chief Justice Bandaranayake made herself an enemy of the regime at least in part by her insist-
ence – in judgments on the Divineguma bill and on the Town and Country Planning Act in 2011 – 
that parliament respect the right of provincial councils to approve any legislation that affects their 
powers in the area of development under the thirteenth amendment. See “The Impeachment as a 
primer on the Rajapaksa way”, Colombo Telegraph, 24 January 2013. The Divineguma bill, which 
was passed on 8 January 2013 by parliament after being approved by all eight existing provincial 
councils, removes any ambiguity about the Rajapaksa government’s will to centralise power in the 
executive and in the family. “Divi Neguma bill passed”, Colombo Gazette (colombogazette.com), 
8 January 2013.  
98 For details on the negative consequences of the government’s military-led economic and political 
policies in the northern province, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North II, op. cit.  
99 Basil Rajapaksa has been quoted as announcing that a new amendment to replace the current 
provincial council system will be presented to the PSC sometime in 2013. “19th Amendment for new 
devolution package”, Sunday Times, 11 November 2012. 
100 Crisis Group telephone interviews, NGO staff and rights activists, February 2013. On Divinegu-
ma, see note 13 above. 
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regulations imposing new monitoring and reporting requirements on UN agencies 
and local and international NGOs.101 
There are also indications that the government has begun undermining the abil-
ity of the Tamil and other parties to campaign effectively. The January 2013 decision 
to withdraw central government funds from elected TNA-controlled local authorities 
is widely seen as an effort to weaken the party’s ability to deliver services to its con-
stituencies in the north.102 The decision runs counter to the government’s stated po-
sition in support of strengthening decentralisation. The regular police and military 
pressure on northern Tamil politicians detailed above seems designed to distract and 
weaken them in advance of provincial elections. There are also reports of attempts to 
redraw constituency boundaries and to change electoral registers in order to strength-
en the position of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and their Tamil and 
Muslim political allies, the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) and All Ceylon 
Muslim Congress (ACMC).103 
Until the government is convinced to change fundamentally its approach to Tamil 
political aspirations, or a new one is elected, any meaningful political solution or ex-
panded devolution of power is extremely unlikely. The best that Tamil parties and 
foreign partners can currently hope for is to preserve the thirteenth amendment and 
resist the completion of the regime’s apparent plan to undermine the Tamil charac-
ter of the north and east. This should begin with efforts to ensure that the northern 
provincial council elections are relatively free and fair. 
The Sinhala Buddhist nationalism that the government cultivated to help win the 
war and consolidate its power in the years since has begun to turn on Muslims as well 
as Tamils.104 Radical Buddhist groups, led by monks, attacked and damaged mosques 
in Anuradhapura in 2011 and in Dambulla in 2012.105 More recently, a group calling 
 
 
101 The “Provincial Policy Directives of Hon. Governor on programmes of UN Agencies, INGOs and 
NGOs in Northern Province” were announced on 16 January 2013 and impose an additional layer of 
approval, reporting and monitoring of the work of local and international humanitarian and devel-
opment NGOs, in addition to the already tight scrutiny imposed by the military-dominated presiden-
tial task force in Colombo. For more on PTF and military control of humanitarian and civil society 
groups in the north, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North II, in particular pp. 12-15. 
102 “Govt. withdraws funds from TNA councils”, Sunday Times, 27 January 2013. The government 
claims the funds were not withdrawn, but returned to the treasury because they had not been uti-
lised. “TNA didn’t use funds, which reverted back to Treasury – officials in Jaffna”, Daily News, 
13 February 2013. 
103 Crisis Group telephone interviews, lawyers and rights activists, Colombo, February 2013.  
104 According to a Colombo-based analyst, “given that President Rajapaksa has no defining eco-
nomic or political ideology with which to galvanise support, he has only Sinhala Buddhist national-
ism to fall back on. So as other problems and reasons for discontent grow, he’ll have trouble crack-
ing down on groups like Bodu Bala Sena [a radical Buddhist group] – unless he were to surprise us 
all and radically shift his policies towards accommodation. But that would carry great risks, too”. 
Crisis Group telephone interview, November 2012. See also “Civil Society statement on Anti Muslim 
Rhetoric and Attacks”, Colombo Telegraph, 15 February 2013. According to the 2011 census, Mus-
lims make up over 9 per cent of the population. “Population by ethnic group according to districts, 
2012”, Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, at http://bit.ly/Rqiggq. 
105 “Muslim shrine destroyed in Anuradhapura”, BBC, 15 September 2011. For photos of the Anura-
dhapura attacks, which reveal the inaction of senior police officers, see http://bit.ly/VdxRE2. “Mus-
lims strike over Dambulla mosque”, BBC, 26 April 2012; “MRG concerned about the attack and 
relocation of a mosque in Sri Lanka”, Minority Rights Group International, 26 April 2012. For a 
useful overview of the attack and the range of reactions, see “The attack on the Dambulla mosque”, 
Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice, 17 May 2012. 
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itself Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force) has organised a series of demonstra-
tions against the slaughter of animals for Halal meat and what they see as growing 
Muslim fundamentalism.106 Muslim businesses in the Colombo area have been tar-
geted for closure in violent public protests.107 A notice sent to all households in a 
Muslim village in Kurunegala district was addressed to “the pariah Muslim who 
steals the wealth of the majority Sinhalese” and threatened: “you will be dead within 
the month of March 2013”.108 
To date, the government has done little to prevent the attacks.109 Muslim political 
party leaders, almost all of whom are part of and beholden to the government, have 
largely remained silent, though recent incidents have forced some to speak out.110 
“Threats against Muslims are intensifying and turning violent”, said a Muslim profes-
sional. “People are getting beaten up. Shops burnt, then Sinhala landlords are asking 
shopkeepers to vacate their premises. People are really frightened and expecting some 
sort of an attack or conflagration … The government is not doing anything, and I am 
not sure that they can control this thing that they started even if they want to”.111 
The increasingly provocative attacks from Bodu Bala Sena and their like have be-
gun to energise the already growing, but still modest, fundamentalist forces among 
Muslims, thus threatening to create the very reality which Buddhist nationalists 
purport to be resisting. Unless Muslim political leaders can persuade the govern-
ment to control its extreme Buddhist allies, there is a real danger of new communal 
clashes and the loss of one of Sri Lanka’s few bright spots – the longstanding politi-
cal moderation of Muslims.112 
 
 
106 In one demonstration, monks and their supporters burned an effigy of “Allah”. “‘Hela Sihila 
Hiru’ stages provocative anti-muslim demonstration with placards and effigy of ‘Allah’ in north-
western town of Kuliyapitiya”, DBS Jeyaraj blog (dbsjeyaraj.com), 28 January 2013. For a useful 
analysis about the rising power of radical Buddhist groups and their relationship with the Raja-
paksa regime, see “Muslims are the new Tamils”, The Asian Tribune, 27 January 2013. 
107 “Protest outside Maharagama clothes store”, Sunday Times, 2o January 2013. 
108 The message was signed “Collective of Buddhist Organizations”. Crisis Group email interview, 
Muslim community activist, February 2013. 
109 President Rajapaksa met with five leading monks of Bodu Bala Sena on 26 January 2013. He 
reportedly told them that “acts aimed at breaching the goodwill and the harmony between ethnici-
ties will not be allowed under any circumstance”, and “urged the group to help maintain the ethnic 
harmony in the country and not to arouse communal feelings”. The monks reportedly claimed their 
organisation’s name was being used by others for attacks they did not support. “Sri Lanka President 
asks Buddhist group not to arouse ethnic tensions in the country”, Colombo Page (www.colombo 
page.com), 27 January 2013. 
110 See, for instance, “Hakeem slams hate campaign against Muslims”, Colombo Gazette (colombo-
gazette.com), 20 January 2013. Despite the rise in anti-Muslim sentiments and the unwillingness of 
the government to act firmly against it, Muslim ministers are expected once again to play a key role 
in lobbying Muslim governments not to support a second HRC resolution critical of the Sri Lankan 
government. The political and economic support Sri Lanka receives from Muslim-majority coun-
tries will likely be one factor pushing President Rajapaksa to rein in radical Buddhist groups. Crisis 
Group telephone interview, rights activists, Colombo, February 2013. 
111 Crisis Group email correspondence, Muslim professional, February 2013. 
112 On Sri Lankan Muslims, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire, 
op. cit. See also Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka: Tamil Politics and the Quest for a Political Solu-
tion, op. cit., pp. 24-27. 
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III. A Real Action Plan 
Were the Sri Lankan government serious about responding positively to the HRC and 
adopting the LLRC’s reforms in the areas specifically mentioned in the HRC resolu-
tion, it should, at a minimum, take the following actions:113 
Investigations: The government should establish a special investigative team in-
dependent of the inspector general of police, the military and the attorney general, to 
conduct effective and independent investigations leading to prosecutions for the 
2006 massacres of ACF aid workers and five students in Trincomalee, the murders 
and disappearances of journalists, the hundreds of cases reported to the LLRC of peo-
ple disappearing after being taken into army custody, and the many reported rapes 
and sexual assaults at the end of the war and in its aftermath.114 
Independent institutions and the rule of law: The government must cease its 
interference in the work of the police and the judiciary and allow them to actively and 
freely investigate and prosecute crimes, beginning by removing the police service 
from the control of the defence ministry. The government should bring parliamen-
tary provisions for removing senior judges in line with international standards.115 
Ultimately, the eighteenth amendment must be reversed and the full independence 
of a range of commissions – human rights, police, bribery and judicial services – re-
stored, including provisions to ensure a less politicised selection of judges. 
Freedom of expression: The government must effectively investigate and prose-
cute those guilty for attacks on and murders of journalists, end ongoing intimidation 
of journalists and political critics, remove blocks on and controls over websites criti-
cal of the government, and enact a meaningful right to information law. 
Demilitarisation: The military should cease its control over development and 
humanitarian projects, allow the civilian administration to function freely, withdraw 
from all commercial activities, reduce the number of troops and the size and number 
of military bases and checkpoints, end intrusive and threatening military surveil-
lance of the population, and return all land seized and held without due process or 
compensation. The government should end its practice of using the Public Security 
Ordinance to grant policing powers to the military each month and should disarm all 
armed groups working with the military or other government agencies.  
Devolution and a political settlement: The government should begin genuine 
negotiations with the TNA on an outline of an agreement on effective devolution of 
powers to the provinces, to be presented to the parliamentary select committee where 
 
 
113 For a valuable and ambitious civil society proposal for how the government should implement 
the LLRC recommendations, see “Giving reconciliation in Sri Lanka a better chance: A Shadow Ac-
tion Plan for the LLRC”, The Social Architects, Groundviews (www.groundviews.org), 23 December 
2012. 
114 For details, see Crisis Group Report, Women’s Insecurity in Sri Lanka’s North and East, op. cit. 
115 Among the relevant documents setting out international standards for the removal of judges – 
which include the right to a fair hearing, the right to independent review, and the right to proceed-
ings in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct – are the 1995 Beijing Statement 
of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region and the 1985 UN Princi-
ples on the Independence of the Judiciary. For details, see International Principles on the Inde-
pendence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors, Practitioners Guide No. 1, 
International Commission of Jurists, 2007, chapter 7. 
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Muslim, Tamil and all parties could then join in a time-bound process of finalisation. 
Negotiations on constitutional arrangements must be accompanied and strength-
ened by the demilitarisation of the north and east as well as other policy changes, 
including an end to land takeovers, Sinhalisation and the destruction of Hindu and 
Muslim religious sites. Free and fair elections to the northern provincial council 
should be held as soon as possible, without prior gerrymandering or weakening of 
provincial council powers. 
Land issues: The government should formally abandon the north-east land policies 
announced in the July 2011 circular, and establish a national land commission to pro-
pose future national land policy guidelines, as required by the thirteenth amend-
ment. Its work should involve the participation of the TNA, Muslim parties and local 
residents in north and east. 
Detention policies: There must be no further delay in making available a register 
of the names of all those currently in detention on suspicion of involvement with the 
LTTE. All detainees – whether suspects/surrendees from 2009 or longer-term de-
tainees – must either be charged or released. 
Other reconciliation gestures: The government should publish and make easily 
available the full LLRC report in Sinhala and Tamil; allow once again the national 
anthem to be sung in Tamil at official events; and establish inclusive public ceremo-
nies designed to recognise and honour the death and suffering of civilians from all 
ethnic communities. 
To respect the HRC’s call to “address alleged violations of international law” would 
require going beyond the LLRC’s extremely limited proposals. At a bare minimum, 
the government would have to: 
 Establish a new investigative body, independent of the military and the attorney 
general’s department, and composed of non-political appointees nominated by 
both the government and opposition parties and fully empowered and resourced 
to investigate and prosecute alleged violations. Their investigations must provide 
effective protection – preferably with international assistance – to all key witness-
es, including government doctors who worked in the “no-fire zones”. It should 
also allow for video-testimony from outside Sri Lanka, as during hearings of the 
Udalagama commission of 2007-2009.116 
 Task the new investigative body to look into the following allegations: a) attacks 
on hospitals and makeshift medical centres, particularly the multiple attacks on 
the hospital at Puthukkudiyaruppu (PTK), b) attacks on civilian concentrations 
and c) those end-of-war disappearances and executions about which there is al-
ready compelling evidence in the public domain, including regarding the alleged 
perpetrators. These include the killings of “Colonel” Ramesh, LTTE newsreader 
Isaipriya, the son of LTTE leader Prabhakaran, and the unknown victims in the 
Channel 4 execution videos.117  
 
 
116 On the Udalagama Commission, see note 25 above. 
117 For information on these and other incidents, see Crisis Group Report, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, 
op. cit. 
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 Institute a fair and transparent process for investigating alleged LTTE abuses and 
for the fair trial of field commanders or other mid- or senior-level LTTE leaders 
now in custody and against whom there is credible evidence of grave breaches of 
international law or serious violations of domestic law (eg, child conscription, 
murder, torture).118 These investigations should ultimately include ex-LTTE lead-
ers now with the government, such as V. Muralidharan (“Karuna”), S. Pathmana-
than (“KP”), George Master and Daya Master – and any others who may be held 
in secret detention centres.  
 
 
118 For information on alleged crimes committed by the LTTE in the final months of the war, see 
Crisis Group Report, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, op. cit., pp. 24-27. 
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IV. What the International Community Should Do 
A. Responding to Sri Lanka’s Twin National Crises 
The policies of the current government pose a formidable challenge to the interna-
tional community and demand a serious rethink of international strategy. Unfortu-
nately, international institutions and influential governments have, since the final 
years of the civil war, remained consistently behind the curve: too slow to recognise 
the speed and seriousness of Sri Lanka’s humanitarian and political crises, and too 
quick to accept the government’s assurances – whether on protecting civilians dur-
ing the war, devolving power beyond the thirteenth amendment or respecting the 
rule of law and ending impunity. 
The dominant framework used by most international partners to understand Sri 
Lanka’s post-war developments – one of slow, disappointing, partial progress that 
needs to be deepened and sped up – is now clearly inaccurate and unhelpful. In light 
of the increasingly obvious manifestations of authoritarianism, governments, multi-
lateral institutions and influential states should abandon the government’s mislead-
ing narrative of progress. Even the evident material improvements in the northern 
province are to a large degree counterproductive for real reconciliation, instead 
opening the way for economic, political and demographic processes that threaten to 
erase the Tamil and Tamil-speaking character of the region. 
Indeed, both of Sri Lanka’s twin national crises have grown worse in the year 
since the HRC’s resolution:  
 Tamil identity and political and economic power in the north and east are under 
unprecedented threat.119 Government policies increasingly appear designed to 
achieve a goal long sought by extreme Sinhala nationalists: to eliminate the abil-
ity of Tamils to claim the north and east as their area of historical habitation 
where they have a right to some considerable degree of self-rule. 
 The island-wide crisis of democratic governance has also deepened with the im-
peachment of the chief justice and the government’s refusal to implement the 
central political and legal reforms recommended by the LLRC. Rather than estab-
lish independent institutions and share power, it has brought under executive 
control not only the judiciary, but also the previously robust form of parliamen-
tary politics.  
There will be no easy answers, and lasting solutions to deep-rooted ethnic governance 
issues must ultimately come from Sri Lankans. Influential governments and interna-
tional organisations can nevertheless work to resist the consolidation and legitimisa-
tion of the government’s authoritarian turn by adopting the following principles:  
 
 
119 As well as the military control, land seizures and political disenfranchisement discussed above, it 
also includes cultural and demographic Sinhalisation. According to a community activist in the 
north, “at latest count, 27 dagobas [Buddhist shrines] have come up in Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, 
Mannar and Jaffna. But how many Sinhalese are there in these districts? This count doesn’t include 
temples in police and military camps. These are just the huge ones …. The whole Tamil identity in 
these areas is being changed. The military is forcefully taking over a community’s visible identity. 
Socio-cultural rights are now being deprived, not just political and civil rights. At least people dur-
ing the war had access to their land and could feed themselves. But now people’s control over the 
land and their livelihood is under serious threat”. Crisis Group telephone interview, February 2013. 
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 international engagement and assistance should respect the “do no harm” princi-
ple by not empowering or legitimating those forces that are undermining the 
democratic institutions necessary to lasting peace and inclusive development;  
 governments should uphold international humanitarian and human rights law, 
investigate alleged violations and hold perpetrators accountable; and 
 international institutions should preserve the integrity and effectiveness of their 
working principles. For development agencies this means insisting on the politi-
cal conditions necessary for inclusive and equitable development, including the 
ability of beneficiaries to express themselves freely and assert their rights, and 
actively working to prevent corruption and theft of local and international re-
sources.120 For the UN, this also means integrating principles of human rights 
and civilian protection in its programming whenever possible. 
B. Reorienting International Engagement – Beyond the UNHRC 
A strong follow-up to last year’s HRC resolution on Sri Lanka remains important. But 
the passing of regular HRC resolutions must not become a substitute for a broader 
set of diplomatic strategies aimed at supporting accountability and reconciliation 
and the eventual return of democratic governance in Sri Lanka. For that, work on a 
much broader set of issues and by a wide range of actors is needed. 
1. The Commonwealth 
The Commonwealth has an important role to play. In light of Sri Lanka’s unambigu-
ous and repeated violations of the organisation’s principles, and in light of its refusal 
to take substantial moves to restore the independence of the judiciary, the secretary 
general should formally refer Sri Lanka to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action 
Group (CMAG).121 Canada has already called on the CMAG to put Sri Lanka on its 
 
 
120 The parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) and Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC) have in recent years produced valuable reports regarding alleged widespread corruption in 
government programs and in the privatisation of state enterprises. See “COPE Exposure & Beyond”, 
Transparency International (Sri Lanka), January 2012. A useful overview of corruption and the in-
effectiveness of various institutions with anti-corruption mandates can be found in “Sri Lanka”, 
“Countries at the Crossroads 2012”, Freedom House. See also information on allegedly corrupt state 
privatisation deals published by the Sri Lanka Corruption project of the Government Accountability 
Project, at http://bit.ly/9HcDwr. One significant and much-discussed source of illegal financial 
gain is the alleged manipulation of prices on the Colombo Stock Exchange. The last two chairper-
sons of the Securities and Exchange Commission resigned and publicly complained about their ina-
bility to enforce regulations against insider trading and other fraud due to political pressures. “SEC 
chairman ousted as probes on 17 ‘players’ near completion”, The Sunday Times, 19 August 2012; 
“Sri Lanka SEC head resigns to ‘uphold principles’”, Reuters, 1 December 2012. See also “Manipula-
tion in the Sri Lankan Stock Market”, Transparency International (Sri Lanka), 24 July 2012. 
121 After meeting government official in Colombo on 10-13 February, Secretary-General Kamalesh 
Sharma announced additional technical assistance and expertise designed to strengthen the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, elections, human rights commission and the media. The statement also 
welcomed the government’s “recognition of the need for change [in how senior judges are removed], 
to ensure that any such process in future … does not call into question Sri Lanka’s commitment to 
the independence of the judiciary and separation of powers”, and pledged Commonwealth expertise 
to assist in any legislative changes needed. There was no indication that the Sri Lankan government 
had committed to make any of the substantial legal and constitutional reforms on these issues rec-
ommended by the LLRC. “Statement by Commonwealth Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma on 
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agenda.122 Other Commonwealth governments should endorse this position and press 
the group to act.  
The CMAG should insist that the Rajapaksa government take substantial steps to 
restore the independence of the judiciary. At a minimum, this would mean a) the 
reestablishment of earlier constitutional provisions – abolished by the eighteenth 
amendment – to ensure a less politicised selection of judges and b) changes to the 
current parliamentary provisions for removing senior judges to bring them in line 
with international standards, and c) the reversal of government plans to limit a chief 
justice’s term to three years.123 
Should the government fail to make substantial reforms, the Commonwealth 
must change the location of its November 2013 heads of government meeting, cur-
rently scheduled to take place in Colombo, or governments must downgrade their 
level of representation at the meeting. 
2. UN Human Rights Council’s 22nd session 
The HRC’s 2012 resolution helped shift the dominant international narrative on Sri 
Lanka away from the government’s misleading story of progress and reconciliation 
and toward a more accurate understanding of the country’s deepening crises. But it 
was only a start. In its upcoming 22nd session, beginning 25 February 2013, the HRC 
should adopt a new, stronger resolution that: 
 clearly notes the refusal of the Sri Lankan government to respond positively to 
the council’s previous resolution by failing to implement the most important LLRC 
recommendations and refusing to investigate credibly allegations of grave viola-
tions of international humanitarian law; 
 details specific measures Sri Lanka must take within the coming year in each of 
the previously noted area of concern in order to be deemed to be implementing 
the LLRC report;  
 requests the government to investigate the credible allegations of international 
humanitarian law violations detailed in the UN Secretary-General’s panel of 
experts report, to be conducted by an independent prosecutor separate from the 
attorney general’s department; and 
 tasks the OHCHR with (a) monitoring and reporting to the council on Sri Lanka’s 
progress in implementing the resolution and on any ongoing violations and issu-
ing an interim report ahead of the HRC’s September 2013 meeting, and, (b) in 
the absence of adequate domestic measures, with undertaking investigations and 
 
 
conclusion of his official visit to Sri Lanka”, 13 February 2013. On 13 January, Sharma “reiter-
ate[ed] the Commonwealth’s profound collective concern” at the impeachment of the chief justice, 
which “will be widely seen … as running counter to the independence of the judiciary, which is a 
core Commonwealth value”. “Dismissal of the Chief Justice in Sri Lanka”, 13 January 2013. 
122 “Canada renews CHOGM threat”, The Sunday Leader, 2 December 2012. Canada’s position has 
been laid out clearly by Senator Hugh Segal, the government’s special envoy for Commonwealth 
renewal. See “Scoping the Opportunity: One Year Before Colombo”, speech to Commonwealth 
Advisory Board symposium, 16 November 2012. 
123 The government is reportedly planning to introduce a constitutional amendment that would 
limit a chief justice’s term to three years and that would give the status of law to parliamentary 
standing orders, thus removing a key reason the chief justice’s impeachment process was nullified 
by the Court of Appeal. “19th Amendment on the way”, The Sunday Times, 20 January 2013. 
Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°243, 20 February 2013 Page 31 
 
 
 
 
making appropriate recommendations with respect to violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law, including extrajudicial killings, sexual vio-
lence and enforced disappearances, allegedly committed in the final months of 
the war, including by compiling a list of individuals about whom there is credible 
evidence of responsibility; 
 encourages the government to invite the special rapporteurs on independence of 
judges and lawyers, torture, human rights defenders, freedom of expression, free-
dom of association and assembly, freedom of religion and extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary executions, as well as the working group on enforced and involuntary 
disappearances to visit Sri Lanka; and request the special rapporteurs to compile 
a joint report to the council on Sri Lanka’s compliance with its international obli-
gations in each of their areas of specialisation. 
3. The role of the UN Secretary-General 
The UN Secretary-General has played an important role in keeping Sri Lanka and 
issues of accountability on the international agenda, particularly through the reports 
of the two panels he established: the panel of experts on accountability, which re-
ported to him in April 2011,124 and the panel that reviewed the UN’s performance in 
the final stages of the war, which reported in November 2012.125 Nonetheless, there 
is more that he can and must do. Should the HRC continue to refrain from establish-
ing its own commission of inquiry into alleged violations of international law, or de-
cline to task OHCHR to conduct investigations, the Secretary-General should use his 
powers under section 99 of the UN Charter to establish such a commission.126 Prior 
to doing so, he should act on another of his experts panel’s proposals and establish a 
mechanism to “monitor and assess the extent to which the Government of Sri Lanka 
 
 
124 “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka”, op. cit. 
125 “Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri 
Lanka”, November 2012, available at http://bit.ly/TEMLxV. The report is often referred to as the 
Petrie Report, after the head of the panel, Charles Petrie. The report’s hard-hitting executive sum-
mary, removed just prior to publication, can be found at http://bit.ly/WGL1KY. 
126 The panel recommended that “the Secretary-General immediately proceed to establish an inde-
pendent international mechanism, whose mandate should include the following concurrent func-
tions: (i) Monitor and assess the extent to which the Government of Sri Lanka is carrying out an 
effective domestic accountability process, including genuine investigations of the alleged violations, 
and periodically advise the Secretary-General on its findings; [and] (ii) Conduct investigations in-
dependently into the alleged violations, having regard to genuine and effective domestic investiga-
tions”. “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka”, op. cit., 
para. 444. When releasing the expert panel’s report, the Secretary-General announced that he had 
been “advised that this will require host country consent or a decision from Member States through 
an appropriate intergovernmental forum”. “Secretary-General releases expert panel’s report on 
accountability with respect to final stages of Sri Lanka conflict”, UN News Centre, 25 April 2011. 
According to the internal review report, “the UN Office of Legal Affairs advised [in 2009] the Secre-
tary-General that he had the authority, under Article 99 of the UN Charter, to establish Commis-
sions of Inquiry”. “Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action 
in Sri Lanka”, op. cit., para. 38. Article 99 of the UN charter states that “The Secretary-General may 
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security”. 
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is carrying out an effective domestic accountability process, including genuine inves-
tigations of the alleged violations”.127  
The Secretary-General and senior UN leadership should also take steps to better 
coordinate the various strands of UN policy on Sri Lanka. This would include follow-
up actions on the 2011 panel of experts’ report, on the HRC resolution(s) and on the 
2012 report of the UN internal review panel, especially as it relates to current UN 
programming in Sri Lanka.128 
4. Other avenues for justice 
Regardless of what action the Human Rights Council and the Secretary-General ul-
timately take on accountability, individual member states should actively assist in 
the pursuit of accountability and help ensure international humanitarian and human 
rights law is respected. Those governments that have called for an independent in-
vestigation into allegations of war crimes – especially India, the U.S., UK, European 
Union (EU), Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, and South Africa – should also 
act on their own.  
They should actively investigate alleged violations by both the government and 
the LTTE and gather and secure evidence where possible.129 There is evidence out-
side Sri Lanka, thanks in part to the thousands of survivors and eyewitnesses now 
living in the diaspora and the availability of satellite imagery. Governments should 
agree to share evidence with credible investigating authorities and also need to send 
clear signals to potential witnesses that they are willing to offer them meaningful 
protection, including through the provision of refugee status.130 
5. Vetting 
Governments should refrain from accepting the diplomatic credentials of any senior 
Sri Lankan military officer who commanded a unit during the war and against whom 
there are credible allegations of war crimes, until they have been cleared by a thor-
ough and independent investigation.  
Until such an investigation has been undertaken, the UN should review Sri Lanka’s 
contributions to peacekeeping operations and refrain from accepting the participa-
tion of its troops and officers. 
 
 
127 “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka”, op. cit., 
para. 444. When releasing the panel of experts report on accountability, the Secretary-General 
announced that “the monitoring and repository functions” of the “mechanism” that the panel of ex-
perts recommended he establish “will continue to be performed by the United Nations Secretariat”. 
“Secretary-General releases expert panel’s report”, op. cit. It does not appear, however, that the 
Secretariat has established the kind of dedicated and well-resourced monitoring mechanism that is 
required. 
128 The Secretary-General has appointed a committee, based in New York and headed by senior UN 
civil servant Michael Keating, to examine how to implement the Petrie report. In addition, individ-
ual agencies have their own processes underway to consider how the Petrie report applies to their 
own work worldwide. To date, however, there is no process established to consider the implications 
of the report for the UN’s work within Sri Lanka. Crisis Group telephone and email interviews, sen-
ior UN officials, February 2013. See Section IV.B.8 below for more on how the UN country team in 
Sri Lanka should respond to the report of the internal review. 
129 For more on options for justice in foreign jurisdictions and the U.S. in particular, see Crisis 
Group Report, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, op. cit., pp. 34-36.  
130 For additional steps governments can take to assist in successful legal action, see ibid, p. 36. 
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The UN’s newly devised policy for vetting all appointments to UN positions is a 
welcome step forward, though the fact that the vetting is to be done by contributing 
states, and not an independent body within the organisation, means the plan still 
falls short of the independent review that is needed.131 Nonetheless, the plan has 
positive features. OHCHR, for instance, should be encouraged by member states to 
make the most of its role in assisting the UN Secretariat’s “information exchange 
mechanism” to be established, including by making reference to the reports of UN 
bodies and other credible independent organisations.  
6. Military-to-military relations 
All governments with ties to the Sri Lankan military should review these relations. 
Until an independent body has conducted a credible investigation of alleged war 
crimes by Sri Lankan forces, and anyone against whom there is evidence has been pros-
ecuted, governments should cease all joint exercises with and training programs, 
other than human rights trainings.132 No country should send militaries to attend the 
next Sri Lankan “Defence Seminar” scheduled for September 2013.133  
7. Targeted pressure on and non-cooperation with the regime  
Influential governments have shied away from taking what they consider a confron-
tational stance toward the government and the Rajapaksa family, largely for fear of 
reducing their leverage and possibly pushing the government to align more closely 
 
 
131 Approved in December 2012 by the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, and to be managed by 
the UN Secretariat Working Group on Human Rights Screening, the policy has three main compo-
nents: a) member states who nominate or provide personnel to the UN are requested to screen their 
personnel and to certify that they have not committed, or are alleged to have committed criminal 
offences and/or violations of international human rights and humanitarian law; b) individuals who 
seek to serve with the UN are requested to self-attest that they have not committed, or are alleged to 
have committed, such crimes; and c) the UN intends to set up an information exchange mechanism 
and procedures to support the exchange of information on prior human rights conduct of candidates/ 
nominees. The policy is to be applicable to all staff in the Secretariat, including in peacekeeping op-
erations and Special Political Missions. Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, New York, January 
2013.  
132 Human rights trainings should nonetheless be limited to individuals not alleged to have been 
involved war crimes or other violations of international law. Current U.S. law sharply restricts mili-
tary assistance to Sri Lanka, including defence export licenses and military equipment or technolo-
gy sale or transfer, conditioning any such aid on the secretary of state’s certification that Sri Lanka 
has met a series of human rights and governance criteria. These include investigating and prosecut-
ing alleged violations of international humanitarian law, cooperating with any UN investigation in-
to such allegations, respecting due process, the rights of journalists, the rights of citizens to peaceful 
expression and association, and policies for reconciliation and justice including “devolution of pow-
er as provided for in the Constitution of Sri Lanka”. Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012. The U.S. military conducts some training of Sri Lankan 
soldiers and assists in humanitarian demining and aerial and maritime surveillance. Those military 
officers who receive training are also subject to vetting under the “Leahy Amendment”, which bars 
U.S. military assistance anywhere in the world to “any unit of the security forces of a foreign coun-
try if the secretary of state has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of 
human rights”. Sec. 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, as amended). 
133 The 2013 seminar on “Post Conflict Sri Lanka: Challenges and Regional Stability”, is the third in 
a series of annual meetings organised by the Sri Lankan military, designed to share its experience of 
“defeating terrorism” and its strategy for post-war reconstruction and reconciliation. Details on all 
three meetings can be found at www.defseminar.lk. 
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with China.134 However, as the continuing deterioration in rights protection and 
democratic governance makes clear, the policy of maintaining leverage by tempering 
criticism and continuing significant financial support has not yielded results.  
Without breaking off engagement on all areas of mutual interest, it is well past 
time for concerned governments to begin to place targeted pressure to signal the 
seriousness of their concern. Among other steps, they should consider restrictions 
on personal travel until the government complies with HRC resolutions. 
8. Review of UN policies in Sri Lanka 
UN agencies based in Colombo should review their full range of programming in light 
of the report of the UN’s 2012 internal review panel, headed by Charles Petrie.135 
One central lesson of that report is that for the UN to live up to its mandate, human 
rights and civilian protection must be made central to its programming and not sac-
rificed in the name of maintaining access for humanitarian or development pro-
grams.136 While the current post-war context is different than what prevailed during 
the high levels of violence in 2008 and 2009, standards of democratic governance 
have in fact declined and protection issues remain urgent today. 
The UN country team should begin by conducting a “human rights audit” of all 
their programming, to examine where and how they can better integrate human 
rights protection into their work. Its human rights adviser should be in charge of the 
audit. 
In light of credible reports that some humanitarian workers, including at least 
some former UN staff members, remain at risk of reprisal from the Sri Lankan gov-
 
 
134 China has been Sri Lanka’s largest single source of financing for post-war infrastructure develop-
ment, providing $785 million in loans and grants in 2011, amounting to over a third of Sri Lanka’s 
foreign financing commitments that year. From 2007 to 2011, China offered loans and grants total-
ling $2.1 billion, and disbursed some $1.2 billion, mainly for the construction of roads and bridges, 
power and energy infrastructure, and a port and an airport, both in President Rajapaksa’s home 
district of Hambantota. The total project portfolio funded by China in 2011 was $2.5 billion. “Annu-
al Report”, finance and planning ministry, 2011, pp. 189-193. China has also provided important 
international political support to Colombo, particularly in the UN Security Council, and was the 
most important supplier of weapons in the final phase of the war against the LTTE. For analysis of 
the complicated relationship between Sri Lanka, China and India, see Crisis Group Report, India 
and Sri Lanka after the LTTE, op. cit., pp. 17-20. 
135 According to senior UN staff in Colombo and Geneva, there is no current or planned process to 
review the organisation’s activities in Sri Lanka in light of the Petrie report. Crisis Group telephone 
and email interviews, February 2013. The Petrie report recommends that the UN “offer to engage 
with the Government of Sri Lanka regarding those elements of the report that are applicable to on-
going UN action in Sri Lanka”. “Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United 
Nations Action in Sri Lanka”, op. cit., para. 87(g). According to a senior humanitarian worker who 
attends UN-led humanitarian country team meetings, “the Petrie report hasn’t phased anyone. 
Things are still going on as before. There was no discussion of the report [at country team meet-
ings] when it came out”. Crisis Group interview, January 2013. The UN resident coordinator in Sri 
Lanka, Subinay Nandy, states that with the newly launched 2013-2017 programme framework for 
UN work in Sri Lanka, “there will be systematic evaluation and monitoring of UN programmes here 
as will be evaluations and assessment under individual agency programmes”. Crisis Group email 
correspondence, February 2013. 
136 Among other things, the report criticised how “a number of UNCT and UNHQ senior staff per-
ceived” “as dilemmas or as conflicting responsibilities” the challenges of “delivering assistance 
while at the same time responding to serious violations of international law that may require the 
UN to issue criticism of the same Government”. “Report of the Secretary-General’s internal review 
panel on United Nations action in Sri Lanka”, op. cit., para. 75. 
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ernment,137 UNHCR, as the only agency in Sri Lanka with a robust protection man-
date and experience, should be tasked with conducting a survey of the protection 
needs of past and present humanitarian workers, both in and out of the country.138 It 
should work with other agencies to ensure their protection and, when needed, their 
safe relocation to another country. 
9. Review of development assistance  
Development organisations – including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
and UN agencies – should review their programs in Sri Lanka in light of the effective 
dismantling of judicial independence and the military’s central role in governing and 
setting the development agenda in the north and east.139 The starting point should be 
the recognition that physical and economic development is not a good in itself with-
out functioning democratic institutions. As Tamils and Muslims in the north and east 
are learning, in the absence of an independent judiciary, representative rule and the 
right to speak freely, “development” can empower forces that undermine individual 
and collective rights.140 
The response of development organisations to the dismantling of the rule of law 
and democratic governance – seen most clearly in, but not restricted to, the north 
and east – should not immediately be to impose strict conditions on aid or withdraw 
assistance to populations in need. They should instead first undertake to do more to 
prevent their programs from assisting in Sri Lanka’s authoritarian turn.  
This will require pressing the government strongly, both privately and publicly, to 
restore the independence of the judiciary and of the bribery commission, enact a free-
dom of information law, protect the rights of citizens to speak freely and contribute 
to the formulation of development policies, and adopt the LLRC’s recommendations 
on land and land dispute resolution mechanisms, beginning with the removal of the 
military from all involvement in land issues. 
As part of the programming review, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, 
ideally in collaboration with the UN and bilateral development agencies, should 
conduct a study of governance and land issues and how these affect the sustainabil-
ity and equity of their action. They should examine the widespread reports of land 
seizures and the alleged role of the military in supporting them, as well as the effec-
tiveness of current procedures available to Sri Lankans to contest or prevent their 
land from being arbitrarily taken. The banks’ largest contributing governments – the 
 
 
137 Crisis Group interviews, human rights activists, aid workers, former UN employees, January 2012. 
138 Recent budget reductions have significantly weakened UNHCR’s capacity in Sri Lanka, despite 
the serious remaining needs of the displaced and recently resettled in the north and east. Crisis 
Group telephone interviews, UN officials, Colombo, February 2013. Donors should increase support 
to UNHCR, including for the protection of humanitarian workers.  
139 The World Bank’s current programming in Sri Lanka is detailed in its Country Partnership 
Strategy, 2013-2016, which was formally approved in May 2012. “World Bank Group New Country 
Partnership Strategy for Sri Lanka”, 22 May 2012. The World Bank’s program anticipates total 
lending of just over $1 billion in FY2013 and FY2014. The ADB’s Country Partnership Strategy, 
2012-2016, was finalised in October 2011. The ADB’s total lending envelope for 2013-2015 is $926 
million. “Country Operations Business Plan: Sri Lanka 2013-2015”, December 2012. 
140 See Crisis Group Reports, Sri Lanka’s North II, Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province: Land, Develop-
ment, Conflict, both op. cit., and Asia Report N°165, Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri 
Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province, 16 April 2009.  
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U.S., Japan, China, India, Britain, France, Germany, Canada and Australia – should 
insist that such a review take place.141 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has loaned Sri Lanka more than 
$2.6 billion since mid-2009, should insist on significant governance reforms before 
it agrees to any additional assistance.142 Along with the two banks and bilateral do-
nors, the IMF should press the government to restore the independence of the judi-
ciary and of the bribery commission, and enact a freedom of information law – all 
needed to ensure the transparency and integrity necessary to sustainable and equi-
table economic growth.143 The IMF should also insist that the government live up to 
its previous pledges to reduce the military budget significantly.144 
 
 
141 The six largest contributors, by percentage, to the ADB are the U.S. (15.65), Japan (15.65), China 
(6.46), India (6.35), Australia (5.80) and Canada (5.25). “Annual Report 2011”, Asian Development 
Bank, vol. 1, 11, April 2012. The largest contributors to the World Bank are, in declining order, the 
U.S., Japan, Germany, France and the UK. See “Voting Power”, World Bank website, at http://go. 
worldbank.org/AXK8ZEAD10. 
142 In January 2013, the government announced its intention to seek another $1 billion loan from 
the IMF for budgetary support, but the IMF reportedly declined to offer any assistance. “Sri Lanka 
seeks budget support loan from IMF: Treasury Secretary”, Lanka Business Online (www.lbo.lk), 
4 January 2013; “Sri Lanka not seeking fresh IMF loan, as earlier planned”, The Sunday Times 
(online), 12 February 2013. 
143 The opposition UNP has asked the IMF and World Bank to press the government to enact 
“financial and right to information legislation” needed to ensure transparency in the distribution of 
funds. “Govt. silent over WB, IMF funds: UNP”, Digathanews.com, 14 June 2012. 
144 In its July 2009 letter of intent with the IMF, the Sri Lankan government promised “savings in 
military spending beginning with the 2010 budget” and “cuts in military and other expenditures”. 
“Sri Lanka: Letter of intent, memorandum of economic and financial policies, and technical memo-
randum of understanding”, 16 July 2009. In practice, the military budget has increased significant-
ly in absolute terms each year since the end of the war, and was increased by nearly 25 per cent in 
the 2013 budget. “Sri Lanka raises taxes to boost defence spending”, AFP, 8 November 2012. How-
ever, as a percentage of gross domestic product, military expenditures had fallen slightly as of early 
2012. For the IMF’s position on the issue, see “IMF Confirms, in its Fashion, Sri Lanka Defense 
Spending Increase”, Inner City Press, 23 February 2012.  
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V. Conclusion 
Sri Lanka’s democratic governance has deteriorated dramatically since the end of the 
war. The institutions designed to check and influence the executive – always rela-
tively weak in the strong presidential system – have been badly damaged, with the 
parliament, and now the judiciary, in effect now arms of the executive. The execu-
tive, in turn, is controlled by an unusually small group of people, mostly of the same 
family. Spaces for dissent and resistance – particularly in the courts and civil society 
– that were open even during the years of war have gradually been closed. While 
protest is still possible, and can sometimes have modest effects, the costs for those 
who pursue it to the point of threatening the government’s plans can be high.  
Influential governments and the international community need to recognise these 
profound changes and reformulate their policies accordingly. They must abandon 
the idea that post-war Sri Lanka is slowly moving toward reconciliation, that insti-
tutions and social relations damaged by decades of war are gradually returning to 
normal, or that the government will grow more comfortable sharing power and re-
leasing its grip on the north and east once the ghosts of the LTTE have faded. Instead, 
the will to centralisation and the disdain for democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law must be recognised as the central characteristics of the Rajapaksa regime, 
increasing social tensions and possibly provoking new communal violence. 
Devising effective responses will take patience and cooperation among multiple 
governments and multilateral institutions. There are no guarantees that ways can be 
found to persuade the Rajapaksa government to shift course any time soon. But even 
without succeeding in doing so, it is still important to defend the values and integrity 
of international law and organisations, and to prevent them from being used to fur-
ther entrench an authoritarian regime. 
Colombo/Brussels, 20 February 2013 
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Appendix A: Map of Sri Lanka 
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